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CHAPTER I . 
INTRODUCTION 
The U . S .  banking industry has encountered difficulties over 
the past two decades . The large number of bank fai lures in the 
recent years ; the collapse of two s tate deposi t insurance systems; 
the severe prob lems facing the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation ; the increased burdens on the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporat ion ( FDI C ) ; and the heavy indebtedness by lesser developed 
countr ies ( LDCs) all put tremendous stres s on the sys tem . In 
addi tion , there are also signi ficant changes· shaped by the 
interact ion of economic ,  technological , legal , and regulatory forces . 
These forces have eroded the tradi tional rules o f  f inanc ial 
institut ions and led to the development of innovat ive financ ial 
instruments and the global izat ion of world financ ial markets . 
Due to these problems and changes , it becomes doubtful 
whether the existing regulations will preserve the s afety and 
soundness o f  the system . Maj or areas for reforms are : the deposit 
insurance system ; the l inkage of banks to other f inanc ial ac tivities 
and nonbank firms ; the payments system ; and , the p o l ic ies towards 
LDCs ' di fficult ies in servic ing their debts . 
Problem Statement 
Deposit Insurance System 
The deposi t insurance sys tem was estab l ished to protec t the 
2 
small depos i tors from bank failures and an insurance l imit was set to 
prevent high risk banks from taking large depos i to r s  from other 
banks . However , the FDIC ' s  general use of purchase - and- as sumption 
method in deal ing with troubled large banks imp l ies 100 percent 
insurance coverage and creates the prob lem of ' moral hazard . ' 
Depos itors are l ikely shift ing funds to banks that o ffer the highes t 
yield wi thout cons idering the soundnes s  of the bank and i t  l ikely 
encourages exces s ive bank risk taking . In the pas t decade , there 
have been numerous bank fai lures creating increased burdens for the 
FDI C .  
Banks ' Linkages to Other Financ ial Activities and Nonb ank Firms 
The maj or res trictions of banks ' l inkage to other financ ial 
ac tivities and nonbank firms are imposed by the Bank Ho lding Company 
Ac ts of 1 9 5 6  and 1 9 7 0  and the Glass - S teagall Act o f  1 9 34 . Banks were 
res tricted from underwriting securities wi th the bel ief that such 
ac tivi ties are too risky .  Also , banks are res tricted in affil iating 
with nonbank firms because of pos s ible confl icts of interest and self. 
deal ing among affil iates . However , many scholars have argued that 
because of the cos t  advantages of economies of scope , and tremendous 
competitive pres sure from other financ ial and nonbank firms under the 
deregulated environment , these res trictions should be el iminated or 
at leas t relaxed . 
Evaluating the reform of these restrictions requires an 
analys is of a number of issues : ( 1 ) Can a bank be insulated from its 
affil iates s o  that the problems of confl icts of inter e s ts and the 
abuse o f  the federal safety net can be ruled out? ( 2 )  Wi l l  new 
act ivities  introduce economies of scope and enhance bank 
profitab il i ty and competitiveness? ( 3 )  Will new act ivi ti e s  bring 
about new bank risk thus creating burdens for the FDI C  and o ther 
financ ial insurance agencies ? (4) What are the roles  o f  supervis ion 
and regulat ion in a res tructured banking sys tem? 
The Payments Sys tems 
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There are a number of payments sys tems in the U . S .  These  
include Fedwire , Clearing House Interbank Payments Sys tem ( CHIPS ) and 
Automated Clearing House (ACH ) . Al though the Federal Re serve 
adminis ters only Fedwire and ACH , it might also have to res cue CHIPS 
as a creditor o f  last resor t . 
There have been concerns that some o f  the procedures adopted 
by these  payments sys tems could impose ri sks on the sys tems . The 
firs t concern is  the credit r isk that the se sys tems as sume by 
allowing rece ivers to ge t funds immediate ly whi le s enders can settle 
the net di fferences until  the end of the day at no cost  of these 
daylight overdrafts . The s econd concern is  the sys tem r i sk that 
these sys tems as sume by guarantee ing trans ac tions i f  a s ender does 
no t have enough reserves to cover its balance at the end o f  the day . 
Furthermore , the increased l inkage s o f  internat ional marke ts 
and increased acce s s  by nonbank firms to the sys tems also raised 
concerns about the ir r isks to these payments sys tems . 
Les ser Deve loped Countries ' Debts 
S ince 1 9 7 0 , U . S .  banks have been playing a maj or role in LDCs 
lending . However , due to world reces s ion and dis inflation of the 
early 1 9 8 0s , many LDCs have been having difficul ty s e rvic ing the ir 
debts . Today , the fundamental question is  how the s e  loans are go ing 
to be paid back in the long run and how is the l o s s  go ing to be 
shared among the lenders (U . S .  bank s tockholders ) , guarantors (U . S .  
taxpaye rs ) , and borrowers ( LDC ci tizens ) . 
Re search Objec tives 
The purpose of this research is  to inves tigate problems of 
the U . S .  banking sys tem and evaluate var ious reform proposals. 
The speci fic obj ec tive s of this  research are : 
1 .  To review four fundamental factors that shape today ' s  U . S .  
banking s truc ture . The se  fac tors are bank char te r ing , branching , 
merging and group banking . 
2 .  To examine the depos i t insurance sys tem and its  shortcomings ; 
review the effects of deregulat ion on the sys tem ; and evaluate 
proposals for re form . 
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3 .  To evaluate and compare op inions on the reform o f  the l inkages of 
banking to other financ ial ac tivities and nonbank firms . 
4 .  To ident i fy the various ri sks that the payments sys tems impose on 
the Federal Res erve Sys tem . 
5 .  To examine the caus es  of LDC loan problems , and s olutions that 
have been pursued . 
6 .  To analyze the banking facil i ties and examine the financ ial 
s tanding of banks in South Dakota . 
Chapter I I  
BANK STRUCTURE : CHARTERING , BRANCHING , .  
MERGING AND GROUP BANKING 
Introduction 
The U . S .  banking system is unusual in that i t  is made up of a 
very large numbe r  of independent banks . Most countries have a few 
large banks that are permitted to branch nationwide . Also , the U . S. 
Constitution granted powers of incorporation to the states , and each 
state , in turn , chartered banks that were author ized to operate 
wi thin i ts borders ( state banks) . The National Banking Ac t of 1 8 6 3  
created the Office of the Comptroller o f  the Currency ( OCC) with the 
authority to charter national banks . This existence o f  both national 
and state chartered banks is called the dual banking system . 
The U . S .  banking stru�ture has been undergo ing adj ustments 
caused by fac tors such as changing laws and regulations , 
technological developments , and market forces. There are three basic 
vehicles through which banks may expand and change their 
organizational forms . These vehicles are branching , merging , and 
group banking. In this chapter , each of these vehicles ,  as wel l as 
the dual banking system , will be discussed . Furthermore , an analysis 
of the banking structure in South Dakota will be presented and 
discussed in Chap ter VI I. 
Bank Chartering 
During the early U. S .  history , banking charters were granted 
to banks on an individual bas is  by s tate legis latures .  When the 
first  commerc ial banks in the U . S .  were founded in the 1 7 8 0s , the ir 
chartering required spec ial ac ts of a s tate legis lature , a 
requirement that he ld until the free banking charter laws o f  various 
s tates were pas sed in 1 8 3 7  and 1838 . 
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By 1 8 6 0 , 18  o f  the then 3 2  exi s t ing s tates in the U . S .  had 
pas sed free banking s tructures .  Even though there were var iations 
among the s tate s , the se  laws essent ial ly allowed banks to b e  
chartered b y  any part ies providing a prescribed amount o f  cap i tal had 
been inves ted and the no tes of the new bank were s ecured with a 
specified amount o f  bonds . The bonds were depos i ted with an agent of 
the s tate who could sell the bonds to satis fy call s  for no te 
redemp tion should the bank fail  to redeem i ts outs tanding notes ( 11 ,  
p .  4 6 ) . 
The free banking s truc ture gave rise  to the prob lem of 
fraudulent banking . Banks were formed to i s sue notes that the bank 
organizers never intended to redeem in spec ie . The no tes were s imply 
_pr inted and c irculated , and the bank would be closed after they had 
al l been dis tr ibuted . Few of the banks that opened for bus ine s s  
under the free banking laws remained i n  ope ration b y  1 8 6 3 . Those  
state s that had few bank clos ings and maintained a s tab le banking 
sys tem during this period had monitor ing sys tems and more res tric tive 
entry requirements . 
The Nat ional Banking Ac t of 1 8 6 3  was pas sed to sort out the 
problems of the s tate banking sys tem by creating a nat ional banking 
sys tem and el iminating the state banking sys tem as we l l  as to help 
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finance the C ivil War . The Act created the OCC to admini s ter the law 
and supervise and examine national banks . S ince b ank chartering 
requirements were l iberal and no .spec ific author i ty to regulate bank 
entry was inc luded in the act ,  the OCC took the respons ib il i t ies to 
approve or rej ect · appl ications for national bank charters .  
In addi tion , the Act set  higher minimum s tandards for 
national banks than were required by the s tate s . The s e  s tandards 
included higher cap ital requirements , higher reserve requirements , 
bank notes backed by government bonds , res tr i c ti ons on as s e ts , 
s tricter reporting requirements , and examinations w i th penal ties . As 
a result , s tate banks had no inducement to become national banks and 
be subj ected to higher s tandards . In 1 8 6 5 , an amendment to the Ac t 
p laced a ten percent tax on the notes of s tate chartered banks . The 
intent was to make s tate bank notes unprofitab l e  and force s tate 
banks to convert to national banks . The tax on s tate banks was 
ini tial ly effect ive . There were more than 1 , 600  nat ional banks (and 
fewer than 400 s tate banks ) by 1 8 6 6 . 
However ,  a decade later , the growing us e o f  checking account 
payments replaced the use of s tate bank notes and caused the tax to 
become increas ingly irrelevant . S ince that t ime s tate banks grew in 
number and the pre sent dual banking sys tem was in p lace ( 11 ,  p .  48 ; 
2 1 , p .  7 ) . 
Branching 
Throughout much of U . S .  his tory , branching has been 
prohib ited or s everely re stricted in most  states because of the fear 
of a banking monopoly by the large northern banks and the fact that 
mos t  s tate banks were s ingle office ins t i tutions (un i t  banks ) .  
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Branching by national banks was no eas ier than for s tate 
banks . Even though the National Banking Ac t of 1 8 6 3  did not addres s 
the branching i ssue direc tly , two of i ts provis ions were interpre ted 
by offic ials as prohib it ing branching by nat ional banks . The first 
provi s ion of the legis lat ion spec ified that the founders  o f  a 
national bank had to spec ify "the place " at which its  lending and 
depos i t - taking ac t i vi t ies took place , des ignating the s tate , 
terr itory , or  district as we ll as the particular county or  c i ty ,  
town , o r  village . The second provis ion s tates that the usual 
bus ine s s  of a nat ional bank shall be trans ac ted at an o ffice or 
banking house located in the place specified in i ts organization 
cer tificate . In addition ,  the Federal Reserve Act o f  1 9 1 3  did not 
authorize national banks to e $tablish branches even though i t  did not 
prohib it  the s tate banks that j o ined the sys tem from operat ing 
exi s ting branche s .  
With the enactment o f  the National Bank Cons o l i dation Act in 
1918 , ful l  service branching by national banks had been made a l i ttle 
eas ier by allowing them to keep the offices of the s tate banks that 
they acquired .  In 19 2 1 , in order to meet the chal lenge o f  s tate 
branch banks , the OCC authorized national banks to open teller 
windows l imi ted to accepting depos its and cashing checks where a 
s tate permitted its banks to branch. 
The McFadden Ac t of 1 9 2 7  explici tly empowered nat ional banks 
to open full service branches ,  though that power was l imi ted in two 
ways . Firs t , nat ional banks could no t branch inter s tate . Second , 
national bank branching was res tr icted to the l imits o f  the c i ty ,  
town , or  village in which the bank was located and then only if  such 
branching was permitted by s tate law .  The McFadden Act was later 
modified by the Banking Ac t of 1933 , permitting intras tate branch 
banking by nat ional banks on the same terms as s tate banks in the 
s tate in which the national bank was located . 
The debate over uni t  versus branch b anking has cont inued 
s ince the founding of the United States . Some o f  the reasons for 
restrict ions on branching were : ( 1 )  Geographic expans ion w i l l  lead 
to s ignificant increases in market concentration . Over t ime , a 
relatively smal l number of ins titutions wi l l  gain control o f  the 
local marke tp lace . ( 2 )  Ant itrus t legis lation i s  no t e ffective in 
curtail ing concentration increases in banking . ( 3 )  Banking 
organizations which compete with each other in a number of markets 
will , in e ffec t ,  col lude with one another by avo iding aggress ive 
compe t i t ion in one market , expect ing s imilar b ehavior by r ival firms 
in other marke ts ( the mutual forbearance hypothes i s ) . ( 4 )  Small 
banks are not able to compete with large banking organizations . 
There fore , if  increased geographic expans ion i s  al l owed , a 
s ignificant number of bank failures wi ll occur , and the number o f  
small independent banks w i l l  s ignificantly dec l ine . ( 5 )  Removing 
res trict ions on geographic expans ion will lead to exc e s s ive market 
power re sul ting in an inferior level of banking services . ( 6 )  
Allowing expans ion will lead to higher bank s ervice prices . ( 7 )  
Service acce s s ib i l ity will decl ine i f  geographic expans ion is  
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allowed . Addi tional ly , the number o f  bank alternat ive s from which 
financ ial services can be obtained will dec l ine . ( 8 )  Geographic 
expans ion will not s ignificantly aid , and may actuall y  hinder , rural 
areas b ecause expans ion wi l l  take place only in more attrac t ive urban 
markets . 
On the other hand , many arguments have b een made in support 
of branch banking . The main theme is  that branching allows for 
better management because larger banks have more res ources to invest 
in training and larger s taffs make po s s ible more special iz ation . The 
s econd argument relate s to as set management . Larger banks can 
achieve greater divers i fication· o f  as sets , thus spreading r isks and 
reduc ing the danger of fai lure . Further , a large bank with branches 
in s everal areas has more s izable resource s and is therefore in a 
better p o s i t ion to meet the seasonal needs o f  one b ranch or  o f  
particular local i t ies . Moreover , in case o f  emergency thes e  
resource s  can be more rap idly mobil ized . The third argument refers 
to improved service to cus tomers . Branch banks can be e s tab l i shed in 
new areas more qui ckly than unit banks and the branches can o ffer 
services  in areas that are not economically s trong or active enough 
to support uni t  banks ( 17 , 2 1 , 5 2 ) . 
Although all these debates continue , a sub s tant ial number of 
s tates changed banking laws s ince World War II to permit branching . 
Several typ es o f  arrangements emerged which fal l into three broad 
categories : ( 1 ) s tatewide branch banking (branches are permi tted 
throughout the s tate ) ; ( 2 )  limited branch banking ( some branching is 
permi tted but only within spec ified geographic l im i ts ) ; and ( 3 )  unit 
1 1 
banking ( branching is not permitted) . 
In 1 9 10 , only 1 2  s tates permi tted branching . In 19 6 1 , the 
s tates that permi tted s tatewide branching increased to 19;  1 5  s tates 
permitted l imited branching and 16 states perm i t ted uni t  banking . In 
1 9 7 3 , 1 7  s tate s permitted s tatewide branching ; 1 9  s tates permitted 
l imited branching ; and 14 s tates permitted uni t  banking . In 1 9 7 6 , 19 
s tates permitted s tatewide branching ; 16 permitted l imited branch 
banking ; and 1 5  s tates permitted unit banking . In 1 9 8 2 , 24 s tates 
permitted s tatewide branching ; 16 states permi tted l imited branching ; 
and 10 s tate s permitted uni t  banking . More recently , the re are also 
the regional branching laws all owing l imited inters tate b ranching ( 5 , 
1 3 , 40 , 5 2 ) . 
Rous akki s ( 1 9 8 4 )  bel ieves that unit banking i s  gradual ly 
giving way to branch banking because of improved transportation and 
communicat ion , the growth o f  bus iness , the increase d  interdependence 
of communi ties , and the increased mob i l i ty of the p opulation . These 
trends have caus ed an increased concern for banking convenience and 
the demand for branch banking . 
Desp ite the exi s tence of re strictions on geographical 
expans ion , such res tric tions have become less  and less meaningful as 
banks have us ed Edge Ac t corporat ions , loan produc ti on o ffices 
( LPOs ) , nonbank subs idiaries of bank ho lding c ompanies  ( BHCs ) ,  and 
other technological deve lopments to. serve cus tomer s  over wide areas . 
The ear l i e r  Edge Ac t of 1919 allowed b anks to open Edge Ac t 
subs idiar ie s  outs ide the ir  home s tate to offer international banking 
service s . The se  subs idiaries operate as commerc ial banks , accep ting 
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depos its  and making loans , but are re s tricted to fore ign cus tomers or  
tho se inc idental to  internat ional bus ine s s . 
Due to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1 9 5 6 , banks are 
permitted to operate LPOs as long as the proces s ing o f  any loan made 
or depos i ts taken · is done wi thin the bank's home s tate . Thus , banks 
have been abl e  to sol ic i t  corporate bus ine s s  nat ionwide by setting up 
out o f  s tate LPOs which are charged with br inging in corporate 
bus ine s s  from the ir operating region . 
The use of automatic te l ler machine s (ATMs ) has been gaining 
popularity . ATMs allow a bank to offer depos i t - taking and check­
cashing s ervices without cons tructing and s taffing a branch . Plac ing 
thes e  machine s acros s  state l ines is des irable where economic 
communities or  me tropo li tan areas spre ad over s tate l ine s ( 3 3 , 43 , 
5 2 ) . 
Bank Merging 
A bank merger occurs when a bank ceas e s  to exi s t  as a 
dis t inc t entity because of its acquisit ion by ano the r  bank . A 
variety o f  reasons has been respons ible for bank mergers in U . S .  
Firs t , a large bank can create a branch by merging with a smaller one 
and with the merged bank then func tioning as a branch of the larger 
bank . As both individuals and bus inesses  have moved from the c i ty to 
the suburbs ,  c i ty banks have wanted to follow the ir cus tomers and 
merging with small suburban banks and maintaining them as branche s 
have allowed c i ty banks to do so . Second , i f  a bank wishes to o ffer 
a new form of service , it may be more economical to buy a go ing 
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concern which has the des ired area of exper t i s e  and an e s tab l ished 
market rather than to bui ld such an area from s cratch and recruit the 
neces sary personne l . Third , economies of scale provide a mo tive for 
mergers . Spreading overhead costs over a larger volume o f  bus ine s s  
reduces uni t  costs . Fourth , mergers allow banks to increase the ir 
cap ital ization and depos its . Because legal l im i ts on the s ize  of 
loans made to one borrower are based on the s iz e  of the b ank ' s  
cap i tal ( 1 5 percent to any s ingle borrower on an unsecured bas is and , 
under certain conditions , an extra ten percent on fully secured 
loans ) , merging allows a bank to enlarge its cap i tal base and make 
larger loans . Fifth , mergers provide a way in which cap i tal can flow 
more readily between regions . I f  a bank in a rap i dly growing area 
merges wi th one in a more slowly growing local i ty , it can shi ft funds 
into the rap idly growing one . S ixth , mergers allow management to 
sat i s fy i ts pre ference for growth while allowing managers to 
divers ify the i r  as se ts . Finally , other factors mot ivat ing banks to 
merge include the des ire to improve earnings and the need or des ire 
to provide b e tter service to existing bus ine s s . 
On the other hand , there are a number o f  reasons why smaller 
banks may find i t  advantageous to be absorbed by l arger ones . Firs t , 
merger may provide the solut ion for a bank having di fficul ty in 
acquir ing cap i tal that it needs , or if it  face s  fai lure . Thi s  was 
i l lus trated by the takeover o f  fail ing banks by s tronger one s during 
the Depre s s ion . Another very important reason for agree ing to be 
absorbed has been the prob lem of management . Sma l l  banks are often 
at a disadvantage in trying to attrac t highly trained and skil led 
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management personne l . As current executives reach re t irement age , 
merger or absorption by a larger bank may seem the be s t  way to secure 
top qual i ty management skill s . Al so , s tockholders o f  -smal l banks may 
des ire mergers  in order to trade the ir shares for tho se  of  the larger 
banks , which often yield be tter earnings and s e l l  for higher pr ices 
( 38 , 40 , 44 , 5 2 ) .  
Although acquis i tion o f  banks has been a recurr ing phenomenon 
in the banking his tory of the Uni ted S tates , the 1 9 5 0 s  saw a wave of 
mergers , almo s t  1 , 600 , that arous ed Congres sional concern over the 
preservation of competition in banking and thi s  led to the Bank 
Merger Act of 1 9 60 . This Act requires prior approval of  the OCC if 
the acquiring bank is  a national bank , of the Board of Governors 
( BOG ) of  the Federal Reserve Sys tem ( FRS ) if the acquir ing bank i s  a 
state member bank , and of the Federal Depos it  Insurance Corporation· 
( FDIC ) i f  the acquiring bank .is  an insured nonmember bank . In 
dec iding on merger reque s ts , each agency is  to cons ider the financ ial 
his tory and condit ion of each bank involved , the convenience and 
needs of  the community served , the character of  the b ank management , 
and the effect  of  the merger on compe tition . Each agency is  also 
required to cons ide r  the advisory opinions of the other two agenc ies 
and of  the Jus t ice Department on the effects o f  the merger on 
competition . 
Not surpr is ingly , it soon became apparent that the s ituation 
led to di fferences of opinion among the government agenc ies  as to the 
net e ffects  on compe tition of particular proposed mergers and as to 
whe the r they should be approved . Certain provis ions of  the Bank 
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Merger Act of 1 9 6 0  were criticized for a lack of c lari ty or be ing too 
general . For example , the ac t did not as s i gn relative we ights to the 
individual c r i teria that regulatory authorities  were to apply to 
merger appl icat ions . As a resul t , federal banking agenc ies 
emphas ized b anking factors , convenience , and c ommun i ty needs . The 
Jus tice Department s tressed competition , re lying on the anti trus t 
provis ions o f  the Sherman Ac t o f  1890 and the Clayton Act o f  1 9 14 . 
Thi s  difference in emphas is led to confl icts in reaching merging 
dec is ions . The se  differences of op inion became an acute pub l i c  
embarras sment when the Jus tice Department i n  1 9 6 5  c ontes ted i n  court 
the merger o f  two large New York banks (Manufacturers Trus t Company 
and the Hanover Bank) that had been approved by the Board o f  
Governors  ( 13 , p .  3 2 1 ) . 
The Jus tice Department won its case . In respons e to the 
resul ting confus ion , Congress - passed the Bank Merger Act o f  1 9 6 6 , an 
amendment to that of 1 9 60 . This Act s tates that the fede ral banking 
agenc ies could not approve a merger that would l e s s en comp e t i tion or 
resul t in a monopoly , unless  the ant icompetitive e ffects were 
outwe ighed by the needs and convenience of the community . I t  
ins tructed the agenc ies to apply common s tandards i n  j udging whether 
a proposed merger would on balance be benefic ial . Also , the Jus tice 
Department was to cease prosecution of cas es  whe re prior approval of 
a merger had been given by the relevant agency . From then on , the 
Jus tice Department was to have only 30 days in which to chal lenge in 
the courts any merger approved by the other agenc ie s , after which the 
merger was exempted from such ac tion ( 1 3 , p .  3 2 2 ; 5 2 , p .  5 0 ) . 
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To unders tand the bank merging case s , the various types of  
mergers  are  l is ted as fo llows : A horizontal merger i s  the union of  
two or more direct competitors . A vertical merger l inks co.mpanies 
that operate at di fferent s tage s of the production - di s tr ibut ion 
proces s .  Conglomerate mergers are all thos e  that are ne i ther 
horizontal nor vertical . Among conglomerate mergers , there are three 
categories : ( 1 )  produc t extens ion , involving producers of  two 
different but re lated products , (2 ) market extens ion , involving firms 
produc ing the same product but occupying different geograph ic 
marke ts , and ( 3 )  pure conglomerate , involving firms w i th nothing at 
all in common. The Bank Merger Act as amended allows horizontal 
mergers if anticompetitive effects are outwe ighed by c ommuni ty needs 
and convenience . Bank mergers which did not involve direct 
compe titors could be viewed as marke t extens ions and were generally · 
accep table ( 2 3 , 3 3 ) . 
Mergers have led to much controversy and conce rn about the ir 
effects on competition . Even though laws had been s e t  up to prohib it. 
mergers that would subs tantial ly reduce competition , it is b ecoming 
increas ingly di fficul t to determine if a merger would actually reduce 
comp e t i tion because the concepts of " indus try "  and " marke t "  with 
respect to banking have al tered dramat ically in recent decades.  In 
the 1 9 60 s , the Court interpreted the concept of comme rcial banking 
very s trictly , segment ing the financial services indus try into rigid 
categories.  However , banks today compete no t only wi th each other 
but also with other financ ial institutions. To secure time depos its , 
they compete for a share of the savings market with such financ ial 
ins t itut ions as s avings and loan assoc iations , mutual s avings banks , 
and credit unions . In rais ing funds through nego tiable  certi ficates 
of depos i t  they compete wi th other partic ipants in financ ial marke ts 
and , at t ime s , even with Treasury securitie s . Banks als o  compete 
with other ins ti tut ions in the granting o f  loans . Loans are of 
different types ,  each o f  which has different kinds o f  cus tomers and 
hence i s  subj ect to a di fferent degree of ins t i tut ional competi tion . 
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In addi tion , commerc ial banks used to be the only producers 
of demand depos its , which made the Supreme Court contend that banking 
as a whole i s  a separate l ine of commerce . Howeve r , in 1 9 7 6  Congress 
authorized all  commerc ial banks . and the thri ft ins t i tutions in the 
New England S tates to begin o ffering negotiab l e  order o f  wi thdrawal 
( NOW) accounts . Enactment of the Depos itory Ins t itutions 
Deregulat ion and Mone tary Contro l Act (DI DMCA) of 1 9 8 0  author ized the 
o ffering o f  NOW accounts on a - national scale . Furthermore , credit 
unions were allowed to is sue demand depos its through share - draft 
accounts . 
The concep t of "markets " has changed dramatically over the 
years , too . Al though real es tate loans and pas sbook savings with 
banks remain typ ically local , legis lation or innovat ions made 
pos s ible the extending of some of the other bank products beyond the 
geographic boundar ies of the local area . For examp l e , bus ine s s  loans 
were allowed to extend acros s  regional , s tate , or even nat ional 
boundaries ; consumer loans can no longer be class ified as local 
because of the national and regional mai l ings of credit cards ; and 
large nego tiable  certi ficates of depos i t  may b e  held by dis tant 
individual s  or bus inesses . Thes e  extens ions of geographical 
boundaries generated a problem in working out a j us t  measure of 
ac tual competition becaus e competition is  generally gauged by 
comparing a bank ' s  as s ets or depos i ts with the total bank assets or 
depos its  held in the area where it operates . 
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I n  short , today ' s  banks in fact deal in a variety o f  produc ts 
and compete directly with other financ ial ins titut ions . Any accurate 
measure of competition in banking mus t take these  fac tors into 
account . Because o f  the cons iderable change in the bus ine s s  
environment o f  mos t  U . S .  communi ties s ince the 1 9 6 0 s  and the gradual 
eas ing of regulatory res trict ions , Rousakkis ( 19 8 4 )  b e l ieved that the 
number o f  mergers will increase s ignificantly in the years ahead . 
Increas ingly communities are s erved by bus ine s s e s  that are 
not locally owned . For examp le , the large retail chain s tores , 
insurance companie s , and other bus ine s s e s  serving the needs of the 
communities are owned by regional or national conce rns . The 
emergence of larger bus inesses  has led to a rise  in c o rporate 
. financ ing demands and an increase in the s i ze  of individual loan 
reque s ts. Th is development and the widening scope o f  banking 
service s demanded by the pub l ic are exerting important pre s sures on 
commercial banks , and will have subs tantial e ffects on banks ' 
dec i s ions on bank mergers . 
The eas ing o f  regulatory res trictions in the 1 9 8 0 s  has also 
made the different financ ial ins titut ions more alike . The enactment 
o f  the DIDMCA and Garn- S t  Germain Ac t expanded the operating powers 
of thri ft ins t i tutions , blurring the ir traditional d i s t inctions from 
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commerc ial banks . Consequently , mergers wil l  b e  eas ier to accomplish 
not only among banks but also between banks and thri fts . In 
addition , the Garn - S t  Germain Act introduced an important departure 
by permitt ing_ the in- s tate and out - of - state acquis i t ion of fai l ing 
ins titut ions in emergency s i tuations . In fact , as the trend to 
reduced regulation cont inues and the compet i t ion among financial 
ins titut ions increases , those ins titutions not able to weather the 
challenge may be acquired by more successful one s . Ins t i tut ions 
fac ing fai lure do not s imply dis solve , but are abs o rbed by be ing 
merged with o ther ins titut ions . 
Group Banking 
Ownership or contro l of two or more banks by an 
individual , group o f  individuals , or corporati on is  cal led group 
banking . A bank holding company ( BHC ) , which i s  a p opular device of 
group banking , is  a corporation that owns one or  mo re banks . There · 
are generally two types of BHCs : ( 1 )  Multibank hol ding company 
(MBHC ) , a company that owns controll ing interes t  in more than one 
bank ; and ( 2 )  one - bank holding company (OBHC ) , one that c ontrols a 
s ingle bank . Sub s idiary banks of a BHC are independently chartered 
banks which pos s e s s  varying degrees of autonomy depending upon the 
organizat ion and operating policies of the holding company . 
Multibank Holding Companies 
MBHCs are es tabl ished primarily to ge t around s tate 
branching res trictions and the prohib ition on inters tate banking in 
s tates that l imit or prohib it branch banking . MBHC s vary in terms of 
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how tightly they control the operations of the b anks they own . The 
individual banks may function qui te autonomous ly or  they may be run 
as branches .  In the latter case , subs idiary banks enab le holding 
companie s  to _extend throughout the s tate a ful l array of spec ialized 
banking services , ·such as trus t and international s e rvice s , that 
would be economically impos s ib le to offer by individual banks even if 
there were a local demand for them . 
Subs idiary banks can benefit from affil iat ion in bas ically 
three respects : Firs t , they can enj oy certain operat i onal 
efficienc ies through the ir relationship with the holding company . 
The sub s idiaries  could ob tain services such as c entral ized and 
computer ized bookkeep ing , auditing , advertis ing , marke t ing , 
purchas ing o f  supp l ie s , research , personnel recruitment , group 
insurance , inves tment counse l ing , and other advis ory s e rvices that 
economies of s cale would otherwise  no t have allowed them to real ize . 
S econd , sub s i diary banks benefit from the ho lding company's 
better access  to cap i tal marke ts for the rai s ing o f  funds . Thirdly , 
holding companies fac i l i tate the mob i l i ty of funds through loan 
participat ion among members of the organiz ation . In thi s  way , 
returns on the aggregate loans of the sys tem are increas ed . In 
addition ,  the returns on bank as sets can be spread over all members 
of the holding company . 
One - Bank Holding Companies 
There are two types of OBHC , bank originated and nonbank 
or iginated . The former occurs when an exis ting bank creates its own 
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holding company , thus plac ing itself in a subs idiary s tatus . Such an 
office i s  also  cal led a congeneric s ince i t  is  formed by a bank to 
engage in related financ ial activi ties such as mor tgage banking and 
factoring . The latter does not draw its or igin from the bank that it 
owns and contro l s . OBHCs can be further divided into traditional and 
conglomerate . Traditional ones are corporations e s tab l i shed to 
control a small  bank , and may also be involved in real es tate , 
insurance and finance . Conglomerate OBHCs are corporat ions that own 
a bank but engage in other activities or have sub s idiar i e s  that are 
nonfinanc ial . Among these  OBHCs , congeneric is the mos t  important 
becaus e it enab les  a bank originated holding company to e s tab l i sh a 
nonbank sub s idiary and enter product and geographic markets from 
which banks are barred . 
Reasons for Growth of Bank Holding Companies 
Bes ides  the primary reasons ment ioned above for the 
e s tablishment o f  MBHCs and OBHCs , there are additional reasons for 
the growth of BHCs as a whole . One reason is  to take advantage o f  
the tax l aws . The subs idiary banks of a BHC are l e gally independent 
banks wi th a common owner . Control of more than 2 5  percent o f  a 
bank's vot ing s tock requires the company to regis ter as a BHC . An 
absence o f  control is as sumed if less than 5 percent of voting s tock 
i s  held . The BOG de termines in each case whe the r  a s tockholding of 5 
to 2 5  percent of voting shares ac tually cons t i tutes control o f  a 
bank . A maj or  source of BHC income is dividends from s tock held in 
subs idiary banks . Such income is almost 100 percent tax fre e  to the 
BHC . Under previous tax law 8 5  percent of dividends were not taxed; 
under the Tax Re form Act of 1 9 8 6 , 80 percent are not taxed . BHCs 
often have negat ive taxab le income after ope rat ing and · financ ing 
expenses are c ons idered . Thi s  negative taxab le income o ffsets 
pos i t ive taxabl e  income of the banks when the BHC files a 
conso l idated tax re turn . Thus , the costs o f  operating the BHC are 
deducted from bank income before taxes ( 5 3 , p .  11 ) . 
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Anothe r  maj or reason for forming a BHC is  to recap ture funds 
during a credit res traint period l ike that o f  the late 1 9 6 0 s . Dur ing 
the 1 9 6 0 s , banks turned to BHCs to supplement the ir funds . By 
forming BHCs , banks could gain greater flexib i l i ty in fund rais ing . 
A bank could recapture funds by having the holding c ompany raise 
funds by i s suing its own commercial paper and funnel ing the s e  funds 
to the bank by purchas ing loans from i ts portfo l i o  o r  bank - issued 
stocks and bonds . In this  way , because  holding companie s were no t 
subj ec ted to intere s t  ce ilings , they could pay re turns higher than 
the bank c oul d offer i ts depositors . Al so , these  funds were not 
subj ect  to re serve requirements and did not have to be insured ( 40 ,  
p .  64 ; 5 2 , p .  6 0 ; 5 3 , p .  1 1 ) . 
Growth o f  Bank Holding Companies and Legis lation 
BHCs are a dominant U . S .  banking indus try feature . This form 
of bank ownership has evolved in response to the inc reas ingly complex 
comp e t i t ive environment in which banks operate and to  increased 
pub l ic demand for varied banking and financ ial servi c e s . 
BHCs  have exis ted s ince the turn of the century , deve lop ing 
originally in s tates that l imited or prohib i ted branch banking . The 
early BHCs were generally informal organizations , and i t  was not 
unti l  the mid- 1 9 2 0 s  that the BHC concept became wel l  recognized in 
the financ ial_community . 
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The beginnings of the BHC movement dates back to the mid-
1920s . Dur ing this time period , agr icultural p roblems and the trend 
toward urbanization created some financ ial difficult i e s  for thousands 
of primar i ly smal l , agriculturally or iented banks . Conse quently , 
some of the small bank owners favored acqui s i ti on by a holding 
company so that a bank could become part of a s tronger banking 
organization . In addi tion , the great surge in s tock prices  in the 
late 1 9 2 0 s  made i t  pos s ible for the holding companie s to obtain the 
needed funds for acqui s i tions . By 1929 there were approximately 2 8 7  
holding companies o f  various types that control led more than 1 0  
percent of the banking o ffices i n  the nation and an e s t imated 2 3  
percent of the dol lar vo lume of a l l  bank depos its ( 5 3 , p .  7). 
Howeve r , BHCs did not expand during the 1 9 3 0 s .  Three of the 
pos s ible reasons inc lude ( 1 )  the economic difficul t i e s  o f  the 1930s 
and depres s e d  s tock values ; ( 2 )  growing l iberal izati on of  s tate 
branching laws that let many organizat ions expand through branching 
rather than holding company acquisitions ; and , ( 3 )  the BHC 
legis lation o f  1 9 3 3 . 
The Banking Ac t of 1 9 3 3  dealt only in a minor way with BHCs . 
This  law covered only those  BHCs that included a Federal Res e rve 
member .  Thos e  organizations had to regi s te r  with the Federal Reserve 
and obtain a permi t in order to vote the i r  s tock . Howeve r , the 
legis lation did not have a great impact on the exi s t ing BHCs that 
owned memb e r  banks . I t  did l ittle to control BHC expans ion and it  
did not s igni ficant ly control BHC inves tments in nonb anking 
enterprise s . 
The BHCs continued to decl ine in the 1940s , but in the 1950s 
they began to expand . Thi s  spread of BHCs led to concerns over the 
effec t of  this  development on competition in banking and the 
potential misus e of bank resources by BHCs . In addition , federal 
legi s l ation was prompted by the ac tivi ties  of a Wes t  Coas t MBHC , the 
Transamerica Corporat ion . As early as 1948 , the BOG o f  the FRS 
initiated ant itrus t proceedings agains t Transame rica , which 
control led the Bank of America in addit ion to 46  o ther banks in a 
five s tate area . When the court ruled in favor of  Trans america , 
public pres sure for regulation of BHCs began to mount ( 1 3 , p .  3 20; 
42 , p .  5 8 ) . 
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The primary purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956  
were to prevent the undue concentrat ion of bank as s e t s  in BHCs and to 
preserve the histor ical separation between banks and commerce . The 
Ac t defined a bank holding company as an organization owning 25  
percent or more o f  the s tock of two or more banks , thus excluding 
OBHCs . The Act required BHCs to regis ter with the BOG , thus 
providing de finite information on the number and importance of such 
organizat ions . The Ac t also required prior approval by the BOG 
before any BHC could acquire more than five percent o f  the vo ting 
s tock of any bank , in this way bringing under control the further 
spread of group banking . A l i s t  of specific fac tors  was enac ted for 
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the Board to cons ider when evaluat ing a proposed acquis it i on o f  a 
bank . The se  fac tors are summarized as fol lows : ( 1 )  the financ ial 
his tory and condition of the BHC and the bank conce rned ; ( 2 )  the 
earning prospects of the BHC and the bank conce rned ; ( 3 )  the 
character o f  b ank management ; ( 4 )  the convenience and needs o f  the 
communities to b e  served ; and , ( 5 )  the preservation o f  comp e t ition in 
the banking indus try . 
The Ac t further s tated that BHCs may not acquire banks 
outs ide o f  the ir home s tates without the permis s ion o f  the s tate in 
which they propose to make the acquisition . S ince at that t ime no 
s tates had laws authoriz ing this practice , the Ac t both prevented 
expans ion of BHCs acros s  state l ines and protec ted e ach s tate ' s  
banking community from incurs ions by companies from o ther s tates . 
Moreover , the Act prohib ited BHCs from engaging in nonbanking 
bus ines s e s , which l imited the hazard of the mi suse o f  funds by 
control l ing holding companies ( 13 , p .  320 ; 2 1 ,  p .  1 5 ; 11 , p .  5 8 ) . 
De sp ite the 1 9 5 6  legis lation ' s intentions to hal t inters tate 
banking expans ion , to separate nonbanking activit i e s  from BHC 
activities , and to avo id concentrat ion of financ ial resources  in 
holding companies , it was found that this act ac tua l ly encouraged 
the ir formation and expans ion as a means o f  overcoming geographical 
and functional barriers . 
The reason the BHC device was used l e s s  frequently pr ior to 
the 1 9 5 6  Ac t was the uncertainty of the status o f  BHC s . In 1 9 54 , 
there were only 46 BHCs . The pres sure from uni t  b anking group s  and 
others for new re s trictive legis lation and the Fed ' s s tated pos ition 
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on regulation o f  BHCs made it clear that such l egis lat ion was likely . 
In addition , s ince severe res triction or even abo l i t ion were pos s ible 
cons equence s  o f  a new s tatute , bankers were he s i tant about the 
holding company form of organization . However , the 1 9 5 6  legis lation 
was hardly draconian and mainly served to c lar ify the s tatus o f  BHCs . 
At the end of 1 9 5 7 , there were 74 BHCs regis tered with the FRS . They 
control led 603  commerc ial banks pos ses s ing 1 3  percent o f  a l l  bank 
dep o s i ts ( 1 3 , p .  3 20 ; 5 2 , p .  5 6 ) . 
In 1 9 6 6 , the Bank Holding Company Ac t was amended .  The 1966  
amendments permitted the Federal Reserve Board to approve holding 
company acqui s i tions that might lessen compe tition , p rovided this 
effect was cl early outwe ighed by benefits to the pub l ic . 
A primary reason for the failure of the Bank Holding Company 
Act o f  1 9 5 6  to achieve its purposes was the maj or loopho le o f  
excluding OBHC s . Prior to the mid 1960s , OBHCs were o ften s ituat ions 
where the bank was a j unior subs idiary . For example , a large 
manufac tur ing company located in a small town might own a bank for 
the convenience of the firm and its emp loyees  but the bank was a 
minor bus ine s s  relative to the manufac tur ing company . Therefore , a 
OBHC was b e l ieved to be j ust a s ingle bank and adequately regulated 
by the bank regulatory sys tem . 
However , between 1 9 6 5  and 1970 , there was an abrupt expans ion 
of OBHC s . In 1 9 6 5 , banks subj ect to OBHCs accounted for l e s s  than 
five percent of the nation ' s  depos its , and the banks involved were 
all smal l . By the 19 70s , such banks accounted for mor e  than one ­
third o f  the nat ion ' s  depos its and included nine out o f  the ten 
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large s t  banks in the country and 43 out o f  the 100 l arge s t  banks . 
One maj or reason for this expans ion was the high interest  
rate environment of the 19 6 5 - 1 9 7 0  period , comb ined wi th the 
l imitations on the interest  rates payable by depos i tory ins t i tutions 
to attract funds , Regulation Q ceilings . Thes e  c ircums tances  caused 
funds to flow out of depo s i tory institutions into higher e arning 
alternative s , such as the Money Marke t Mutual Funds . Thi s  process is 
called dis intermediat ion . This made Cert i ficates o f  Depos i t  ( CDs ) an 
unstable s ource of funds to the banks . In orde r  to expand the ir 
power to rais e  funds , large banks formed OBHCs . The advantage of 
do ing so was that holding companies can generate funds for the bank 
in ways not al lowed the bank itself . For examp l e , al though a bank 
itself  is not permi tted to is sue commercial paper , and thus borrow 
short term funds in this way , an OBHC can do s o  in i t s  own name and 
then give thes e  funds to its bank . Another reason for banks to form 
OBHCs is  to divers ify into new produc t lines and new geographic 
markets through the acquis i tion of a variety o f  nonbank bus ine s s es 
such as mortgage companies , leas ing firms , finance c ompanies , data 
proces s ing firms , and many others ( 2 1 , 40 , 5 3 ) . 
The growth o f  OBHCs called for the Fede ral Re serve to 
regulate the ac tivi ties of these companies , including plac ing l imits 
on the nonbank ac tivities in which these companies can engage thus 
leading to the 1 9 70 amendment to the Bank Ho lding Company Act o f  
1 9 56 .  The 1 9 7 0  amendment had three main goals , e ach o f  which has 
s ignificantly influenced the subsequent growth o f  U . S .  BHC s . First , 
OBHCs were no longer excluded from regis trat ion requirements . They 
were required to regi s te r  wi th the Federal Reserve Board and were 
subj ec t to approval when acquir ing a bank or nonbank bus ines ses . 
Second , the defini tion of holding company control over 
individual banks was expanded .  I f  a company was found to exerc ise 
contro l l ing influence over a bank , it might be required to regis ter 
with the Federal Reserve Board as a BHC , regardle s s  of what 
propor tion of bank s tock the company held . 
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Th ird , nonbanking ac tivities that a company c ould pursue were 
re stricted to inc lude only those " so closely related to banking or 
managing or contro l l ing banks as to be a proper inc i dent thereto . "  
( 2 1 , p .  1 6 )  
The rul ings on such ac tivi ties through May 1 ,  1 9 8 2 , are shown 
in Tables  2 . 1 ,  2 . 2  and 2 . 3 .  
The BOG of the FRS is in charge of what ac tivities  can be 
engaged by OBHCs and MBHCs . The criteria used in approving or 
denying reque s ts by BHC s to enter nonbanking activi t i e s  are whether 
certain activi ties  are closely re lated to banking and whe ther these 
activit i e s  are s imilar to bank lending or operationa l ly integrated 
into the lending proce s s . Other criteria such as pub l ic interes t and 
convenience ,  effic iency of management , confl ict o f  intere s t , and 
competit ion vs . concentrat ion might also be cons idered . 
The 1 9 7 0  amendment gave the BOG increased respons ib i l ities 
for regulating the BHC s . Its re spons ib i l i ties  are summed as follows : 
1 .  granting prior approval for BHC formations 
2 .  granting p r ior approval for BHC bank acqui s i tions 
3 .  de termining permis s ible nonbanking activities o f  BHCs 
. Table 2 . 1 :  Nonbank Activities Permi tted by Regulation for Bank 
Ho lding Companies under Sect ion 4 ( c ) 8 o f  Regulation Y ,  
April  30 , 1 9 8 2  
1 .  Extens ions o f  credit 
Mortgage banking 
Finance companies : consumer , sales and commerc ial 
Credi t cards 
Fac tor ing 
2 .  Indus trial bank , Morris Plan bank , indus tr ial loan company 
3 .  Servic ing loans and other extens ions o f  credit 
4 .  Trus t company 
5 .  Inves tment or financ ial advis ing 
6 .  Full - p ayout leas ing of personal or real property 
7 .  Inves tments in community welfare proj ects 
8 .  Providing bookkeep ing or data - proce s s ing s e rvice s  
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9 .  Ac ting as insurance agent or broker primar i ly in connec t ion with 
credit extens ions 
10 . Underwr it ing credit l i fe , accident and hea l th insurance 
11 . Providing courier services 
12 . Management consul ting for unaffil iated banks 
13 . Sale at retai l of money orders wi th a face value of no t more 
than $ 1 , 000 , trave ler ' s  checks , and savings bonds 
14 . Performing appraisals of real es tate 
15 . Audit  s e rvices for unaffil iated banks 
16 . I s suance and s ale of traveler ' s  checks 
17 . Management consul ting to nonbank depos itory ins t i tutions 
Source :  Rous s akis ,  Emmanue l N .  Commercial Banking in an Era o f  
Deregulation . Praeger Publishers , New York , NY ,  1 9 8 4 , pp . 
6 2 - 3 .  
Table 2 . 2 :  Nonbank Activities Permitted by Orde r  for Bank Holding 
Companies under Section 4 ( c ) 8  of Regulation Y ,  Apr i l  30 , 
1 9 8 2  
1 .  I s suance and sale of traveler ' s  checks 
2 .  Buying and s e l l ing gold and s ilver bull i on and s i lve c o in 
3 .  I s suing money orders and gene ral - purpose , variab l e - denominated 
payment ins truments 
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4 .  Future s  commiss ion merchant to cover go ld and s i lver bul l ion and 
co ins 
5 .  Underwriting certain federal , s tate , and munic ipal s e cur ities 
6 .  Check ver i fication 
7 .  Financ ial advice to consumers 
8 .  I s suance o f  small - denomination debt ins truments 
Source : Roussakis , Emmanue l N .  Commerc ial Banking in an Era of 
Deregulat ion . Prae ger Pub l i shers , New York , NY ,  1 9 84 , pp . 
6 2 - 3 .  
Table 2 . 3 :  Nonb ank Ac tivi ties Denied by Board for Bank Ho lding 
Companies under Section 4 ( c ) 8  of Regulation Y ,  Apr i l  30 , 
19 8 2  
1 .  Insurance premium funding ( comb ined sales o f  mutual funds and 
insurance ) 
2 .  Underwr it ing l i fe insurance not related to credit extens ion 
3 .  Real e s tate brokerage 
4 .  Land deve lopment 
5 .  Real e s tate syndicat ion 
6 .  General management consulting 
7 .  Property management 
8 .  Computer output microfi lm services 
9 .  Underwr iting mortgage guaranty insurance 
10 . Operating a s avings and loan association 
1 1 . Operating a travel agency 
12 . Underwr it ing property and ·casualty insurance 
13 . Underwr i t ing horne loan l ife mortgage insurance 
14 . Orbanco : inves tment note is sue with trans ac tional 
characte r i s tics 
Source : Rous s aki s ,  Emmanuel N .  Commercial Banking in an Era o f  
Deregulat ion . Praeger Publishers , New York , NY ,  1 9 84 , pp . 
6 2 - 3 . 
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4 .  granting prior approval for BHC nonbank acquis i t ions 
5 .  granting prior approval and regulation of fore i gn bank and 
nonbank aff i l iates of BHC s 
6 .  general supervis ion of BHCs and subs idiaries - - examinations 
7 .  re s tricting i llegal t ies between bank and nonbank affi l iates in 
a BHC 
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Al though the OBHC loophole was taken care o f , the 1 9 7 0  Act 
opened a new loophole by i ts defini tion of a bank as a firm which 
both accepts  demand depos i ts and makes commerc ial loans . By engaging 
in only one of these  ac tivi tie s , a nonbank financ ial s e rvices firm 
can ,  in effect , become a nonbank bank . This l�ophole has also 
allowed BHCs to extend the ir geographic reach by opening a nonbank 
bank in a new market . For example , the new nonbank sub s idiary may 
accept demand depos its and offer all other financ ial s e rvices and 
products . As long as i t  refrains from making commerc i al loans i t  is 
no t a bank under the law .  Commerc ial loans can b e  made indirec tly by 
referring such app l ications to an affi l iate within the BHC . 
On top of that , BHCs have also tried to go acro s s  s tate l ines 
by taking advantage of the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding 
Company Act .  Sect ion 3 ( d) of this amendment allows BHCs to acquire 
out - o f - s tate banks wherever s tate laws permit them to do s o . For 
examp le , after South Dakota enac ted legis lat ion in 1 9 8 0  permitt ing 
l imited out - o f- s tate BHC activity within its borders , C iticorp of New 
York moved i ts credi t card divis ion to the state ( 5 2 , p .  6 4 ) . 
Consequently , the BHC trend continued to grow . From 1 9 6 5  to 
1 9 7 8 , the depo s i t s  contro lled by BHCs exploded from 1 2 . 8  percent of 
the total to over 70  percent . At the end o f  19 8 1 , there were 3 , 702  
BHCs , and they he ld 9 9  percent o f  all depos i ts in the nat i on ( 2 8 , p .  
8 8 ) . 
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CHAPTER I I I  
DEPOS IT INSURANCE 
S truc ture of the Depo s i t  Insurance Sys tem 
The adopt ion of a depos i t insurance sys tem for the U . S .  
banking sys tem s tarted wi th the Banking Ac t of 19 3 3 . I t  was believed 
that the exi stence o f  depos i t  insurance coupled with a more extens ive 
supervisory and regulatory sys tem would l imit bank fai lures to a 
manageable number and this  prove d to be true . S ince 1 9 34 , the bank 
fai lure rate has been relatively low and 9 9  percent o f  the depos its 
in those  failed ins t i tutions have been pro tected for depos i tors ( 1 1 , 
p .  150) . 
Firs t , the Federal Depo s i t Insurance Corporation ( FDIC ) was 
es tab l i shed to provide depos i t  insurance for comme rcial banks . Soon 
the reafter ,  the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporat ion 
( FSLI C )  was e s tab l i shed to insure depos its at Savings and Loans ( S  & 
Ls ) .  Thes e  two agenc ies have very s imi lar func tions and powers , 
al though admini s trative procedures and organizational form di ffer . 
For example , the FDIC is  an independent agency whi l e  the FSLIC is 
admini s tered by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ( FHLBB ) .  Also , the 
FSLIC re l ies  on the FHLBB for the services of examiners  and other 
s taff pers onnel . The FSLIC ' s  status as a part o f  the Federal Home 
Loan Bank sys tem serve s to cons ol idate the supervisory , regulatory , 
and insurance function in a s ingle agency for al l fede rally chartered 
S & Ls , unl ike the mul ti - agency sys tem for commerc ial banks . 
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The thi rd depos i t insurance fund , the Nat i onal Credit Union 
Insurance Fund (NCUI F) , was es tab l ished in 1 9 7 0 . The NCUIF i s  
admini stered b y  the National Credi t Union Adminis tration and insures 
depos its in credit unions in a fashion s imi lar to the FDIC and FSLIC . 
The 1 9 3 3  Banking Act set FDIC premiums at one - twel fth o f  one 
percent of the depos i ts ( less  certain adj us tments )  o f  insured b anks . 
These  as s e s sments at firs t had to be remitted semiannual ly to provide 
funds for operat ing cos ts as well as maintenance o f  an insurance fund 
but in 1 9 6 2  the Congre ss mandated annual rebates to insured 
ins titut ions o f  two - thirds of col lected as ses sments , le s s  agency 
expense .  In 1 9 8 1 , this mandated rebate leve l was trimmed to 60 
percent , with l e s s er or greater amounts be ing permitted according to 
the amount of the reserve fund relative to insured depos its . y in 1982  
the effective as s e s sment rate to  FDIC insured banks was one ­
thirteenth o f  one percent of as sessable depo s i ts , up from one ­
fourteenth o f  one percent in 1981 . FSLIC premiums were s imilar ly 
s truc tured ,  however , in the last two years FSLIC premiums have been 
raised to cover fai l ing S & Ls ( 1 1 , pp . 152 - 154 ; 5 5 ) . 
The FDIC  depos i t  insurance plan focus ed on the amount , no t 
the type , o f  depo s i t . The ce i l ing amount was rai s ed per iodically . 
The or iginal ce i l ing was $2 , 500 , it  was later raised to $ 5 , 00 0  where 
it  remained unt il 1950 . The current amount is  $ 100 , 000 brought about 
by the DIDMCA o f  1 9 8 0 . Demand , savings , and � ime depos i ts in 
commerc ial b anks were covered up to the ce i l ing amount , with S & L 
association shares and depos i ts be ing s imi larly covered . Nondepos it 
l iab i l ities o f  insured banks were not covered . The d i s t inc t ion in 
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favor o f  the amount o f  depos it , rather than the type o f  depo s it , is  
s igni ficant in the sense that it sugges ts that protection o f  
depos itors is  the pr imary purpose o f  depos it  insurance . · Prevention 
of bank failure due to depos it runs is  a s econdary purpose , and 
protection o f  the money supply ( transact ions accounts ) is  at best a 
tertiary obj ective . 
� 
The depos i t  insurance agenc ies ( FDIC , FSLIC , NCUIF)  are 
obl i ged to share the ir authority to examine insured banks with the 
OCC , the FRS , and the various s tate banking commi s s ions . 
Approximately twice a year examiners arrive unannounced at a bank and 
spend days or  weeks , _ depending on the s ize  of the bank , go ing over 
its operations . To ensure the bank ' s  sound condition and the 
compliance with all appl icable laws and regulations , the bank 
examiners inves t igate the bank ' s  as sets , cap ital , l iquidity , earnings 
and management . S ince the loan ·-portfolio is the area o f  greates t  
potent ial vulnerab i l i ty for a bank , the bank examiners  look a t  loans 
in cons ide rable de tai l . Each loan above a minimum s iz e  i s  examined 
individual ly . Al so , comp l iance with regulations regarding loan s ize 
and el igib i l i ty o f  the borrower is as sured . Adequacy o f  the 
financial informat ion on the borrower is also checked .  Then loans 
are clas s i fied according to the leve l of risk they represent . Loans 
j udged to be uncollectible are clas s ified as a l o s s  and mus t be 
charged o ff .  " Doub tful " loans are those  expected to involve part ial 
los s . Loans cons idered unduly risky ,  and thus call ing for careful 
supervis ion , are label led " subs tandard . "  Furthermore , the examiners 
as s e s s  the qual ity of the management and ensure the abs ence o f  fraud . 
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After the above investigat ions , a formal report i s  submitted 
to the bank ' s directors . The report covers all p rob lems or  fai l ings 
found during the examination and might comment on spe c i fic management 
practices that are cons idered unsound or prob lematic . According to 
the Financ ial Supervisory Ac t of 1 9 6 6 , bank direc tors are required to 
implement the recommendations . Otherwise , it might resul t  in the 
removal of the officers or directors involved .  
In 1 9 74 , after the fai lure o f  the Frankl in Nat ional Bank , the 
Congres s  looked into the procedures of bank evaluation and found that 
these  procedure s  varied cons iderably in terms of what aspects o f  
banking ac tivi ty wer� examined and how perform�nc e was rated . In 
fact , different s tandards were be ing applied to diffe rent banks . Due 
to this lack o f  uniformity , there was no t a coherent a s s e s sment of 
the heal th o f  the banking sys tem as a whole . Al s o , i t  was found that 
the examining agenc ies did no t make more intens ive and frequent 
evaluat ion e fforts on banks with demons trated weakne s s . In order to 
remedy these  faults , the Uniform Inte ragency Bank Rat ing Sys tem was 
introduced in 1 9 7 8 . It  identified five di stinc t areas o f  bank 
operat ion and evaluat ion : Cap ital adequacy , As s e t  qual i ty ,  Management 
and admini s trat ion , Earnings qual ity and quant ity and Liquidity 
leve l . Each o f  the se  areas is  rated on a scale o f  1 ( " s trong" ) to 5 
( "unsatis factory and in need of immediate remedial attent ion" ) .  
Als o , the bank as a who le receive s a compos it� rat ing on thi s  scale . 
Banks with compos ite rat ings of 1 are examined re latively 
infrequently , while those  wi th the 5 rating undergo continual 
scrutiny . 
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Another me thod of checking , the National Bank Surve i llance 
Sys tem (NBS S ) , has been in operation s ince 1 9 7 5 . The NBS S  i s  
adminis tered b y  the OCC and is us ed t o  as sess  the ongo ing performance 
of national banks . The NBSS sys tem has four bas ic components : ( 1 )  
the Bank Performance Report (BPR) which i s  comp i led from the bank ' s 
financ ial s tatements and the nat ional bank examinat ion reports ; ( 2 )  
the Anomaly S everity Rating Sys tem (ASRS ) which as s igns scores to 
various aspects of bank performance for the purpose of detecting 
problem areas and measuring their severity ; ( 3 )  the NBS S  spec ial i s ts 
comp ile  a report based on the BPR and the ASRS and submi t  i t  wi th 
recommendations to the Regional Adminis trator o f  Nat ional Banks . 
When actual or po tent ial problems have been identi fied , the bank 
undergoes further scrutiny and a correction plan is  devised in 
consul tation wi th the bank ' s  management ; ( 4 )  the Ac tion Contro l 
Sys tem moni tors banks ' progre s s  in correcting ident ified problems . 
The NBSS is a us eful tool for the bank directors and managers 
as we ll as for regulatory agenc ies because bank manager s  can use this 
information to j udge the ir own performance . The FRS us e s  the s ame 
sys tem in monitoring s tate chartered member banks , and the FDIC  has 
developed a s imi lar sys tem of bank surve illance , the Integrated 
Monitoring Sys tem ( 5 2 , pp . 64 - 6 8 ) . 
There are generally five approaches that the regulatory 
authorities can use to deal with fail�d or fa� l ing insured dep o s i tory 
ins titut ions . They are : ( 1 )  close and l iquidate the ins t i tution and 
pay depo s i tors the full value of the ir insured depos i ts up to the 
maximum insurance amount , shar ing wi th uninsured depos i tors and 
creditors any l o s s e s  due to an excess of the amount o f  insured 
depos its over the proceeds of l iquidated as sets ; ( 2 )  as s is t  in the 
proce s s  of the failed ins titution be ing absorbed by ano ther ( new or 
exist ing) ins t i tution (purchas e - and- as sumption) ; ( 3 )  provide 
resources to keep the fail ing ins t itut ion afloat ; ( 4 )  reorgani z e  the 
troub led ins t i tution which would ordinarily require nondepos i t  
creditor cooperation and concess ions ; or , ( 5 )  temporar i ly ( a  maximum 
o f  two years i s  al lowed) take over operations o f  the failed 
ins titut ion . 
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Traditional ly bank regulators could not c lo s e  a bank until 
its book value became negat ive . However , s ince the Competitive 
Equali ty Banking Act of 1 9 8 7 , chartering authorities  can c l o s e  a bank 
when book ins o lvency appears imminent . The FDIC and FSLIC emp loy the 
purchase - and - as sumpt ion approach in the maj ority o f  cas es . I t  i s  
often less  cos tly t o  the insurer than the depos i t payoff and it  
avo ids the negat ive effect  that liquidations of larger banks might 
have on pub l i c  confidence in depos itory ins t i tut ions in general . 
However , the financ ial as s i s tance involved in the purchas e - and­
as sump tion ac tions in 1 9 8 1  and 1 9 8 2  bal looned for both the FDI C and 
FSLIC thus urging them to make increased us e o f  noncash as s is tance 
and to increas e the effective depos i t insurance premiums ( 6 , 7 ,  1 1 ) . 
Effects o f  Deregulation on Depository Insurance Sys tem 
While many o f  the supporters of the current dep o s i t  insurance 
and regulatory sys tem claim that the exis tence of the sys tem was to 
protect the interes t s  of the small depos itors , Car l s trom ( 19 8 8 ) 
40 
que s tions the need to insure depos itors up to the current maximum o f  
$ 100 , 000 . He emphas izes that the protect ion should be provided in 
the mos t  cost e ffec tive way and suggests  that the federal government 
allow an income . tax credi t so that depos i tors could deduc t the ir 
losses , up to a legis lated maximum . 
Title 1 o f  the Garn - S t  Germain Deposi tory Ins ti tutions Act of 
1 9 8 2 , the Depos i t  Insurance Flexib ility Act ,  broadened the s cope of 
depos it  insurance agency powers to cope with fai l ing and failed 
ins titut ions . I t  expanded the circums tances  and forms by which the 
FDIC  and FSLIC can provide cap ital as s is tance to troub led , insured 
ins titut ions and can . use  the ir funds to fac i l i tate mergers with 
rescuing ins titut ions . It  also allowed out - of - s tate acqui s i tions of 
fai l ing ins titutions in certain c ircums tances . 
The 1 9 8 2  legis lat ion allows the regulators to make a loan to , 
depos i t  in , purchase as se ts from , purchas e securities  i s sued by , and 
as sume l iab i l i ties  o f  a fail ing institution . The main feature of 
this i s  a s o - called ne t - worth certi ficate program . The i s suance of 
ne t - worth certi ficates by the FDIC and FSLIC  to troubled ins t i tutions 
are intended to improve the ir book net worth pos i t ions . For 
regulatory purposes these  certi ficates is sued to the flounder ing 
organizations are treated as capital and thereby improve the cap i tal 
pos it ion which had been eroded by losses . The bene f i ts o f  thi s  
program are the contr ibutions t o  the maintena�ce of a comp e t i t ive 
financ ial sys tem ; the reduc tion of the risk of fai lure for 
floundering ins titutions ; the allowance of regulators to " gamble " 
that fal l ing interest rates wi ll allow the ir re scue e fforts to 
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succeed wi thout any cash outlay ; and the as s is tance in the early 
identi fication o f  nonviab le ins titutions . On the o ther hand , Cooper 
and Fraser ( 1 9 8 4 )  commented that this program i s  only an art ific ial 
expans ion of the cap i tal account because the prom i s s ory no tes i s sued 
by the dep o s i t  insurance agenc ies for the. ne t - worth certi ficates 
carry the same yield as the latter . 
In addit ion to the broadened power in deal ing with fai l ing 
ins titut ions , depos itory insurance regulatory authorities  were 
allowed greater flexib ility in the merging o f  fai led ins t i tut ions . 
Because the new legis lat ion relaxed the geographi c  and ins t i tutional 
barriers which formerly cons trained merging ac tivit i e s , the FDIC  may 
now allow the acquis i tion of a large commerc ial b ank or  mutual 
savings bank ( over $ 500 mill ion in total as sets ) by ano ther federal ly 
insured ins titution whether the institution is  in - s tate or  out - of ­
s tate . For a fail ing bank , bids. may be taken only from federally 
insured depos ito ry ins titutions . I f  the lowes t  b i d  c omes from e ither 
an out - of - s tate ins titution or from an ins titut ion of a type 
different from the fai l ing one , then bids may be taken aga in . The 
fo llowing priorities guide the regulatory authorities  in minimiz ing 
the ir los s from the sale : ( 1 )  same type , in - s tate ins titutions ; ( 2 )  
same type , out - o f - s tate institut ions ; ( 3 )  di fferent typ e , in- s tate 
ins titut ions ; ( 4 )  di fferent type , out - of - state ins t i tutions ; ( S ) among 
out - o f - s tate bidders , priority is to be given .to adj acent s tate 
ins titutions ; ( 6 )  the FSLIC , but not the FDIC , i s  to give priority to 
minority control led bidders when a minority contro lled thri ft fails 
( 11 , pp . 1 3 2 - 3 ) . 
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Problems of the Depo s it Insurance Sys tem 
The princ ipal purpose of depo s it insurance is  to reduce the 
external e ffect o f  bank failures and protect small depos i tors , who 
cannot afford the cost of good information , from b ank failure s . The 
insuranc e l imit is  des igned to prevent r isk loving banks from taking 
large depo s i tors from other banks by offering higher y i e lds . 
Uninsured large depos itors restrict bank r isk taking and reduce 
failures .  However , the DIDMCA of 1980 raised the insurance l imit 
from $40 , 000 to $100 , 000 . 
In addit ion , the FDIC usually chooses purchase - and ­
assump tion or payout . to minimize cos t to the FDIC but has used 
purchase - and- as sumption for al l large banks unt il 1 9 8 2  to avo id bank 
runs . Thi s  implies  100 percent insurance and c reate s " moral hazard" 
in that it l ikely encourages excess ive bank risk taking . Large 
dep o s i tors were shift ing depos its through money brokers  to risky 
banks without checking the bank ' s  solvency because the depos i ts were 
bel ieved to be 100 percent insured s ince the FDIC  had always used the 
purchase - and- as sumption me thod . Money brokers began dividing large 
depos its  into $ 100 , 000 p ieces and putting the p ieces into different 
banks so the total amount was insured . 
Payout has been used only for small banks which have few 
large depo s i tors , but thes e  few share losses with the FDI C . The FDIC 
used payout with Penn Square in 1982 to s top the use o f  brokered 
dep o s i ts by ri sky banks . 
To reduce the moral haz ard of bank risk taking , insurance 
should be l imi ted and large depos itors should expect l o s s e s  from bank 
failure . To e l iminate any external effects o f  a fai lure , however ,  
depos itors should not take any losses and insurance should be 
unl imi ted . When brokers and large depos itors real ized that 
insurance , though l imited by law ,  was unl imited in practice they 
behaved predic tably . 
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Regulators have been faced with some unre gulated r isks : 
interes t rate r i sk , fore ign risk , technological r i sk , and o ff - balance 
sheet ac tivi ty risk . The insuree (bank) has more knowledge o f  its 
exposure to such ri sks than the insurer ( regulator - - FDIC ) . Thi s  
creates a problem o f  adverse selection where higher r i sk insureds are 
more l ikely to buy insurance than lower risk because the insurance 
price is not risk based . 
Depos i t insurance premiums are the produc t o f  a premium base 
and a premium rate s o  that the re are quest ions about b o th the 
appropriate base and the appropriate rate . The base now us ed i s  
total domes tic bank depos its . S ince large banks have a larger share 
of the ir total depos its he ld in large , uninsured accounts , they 
bel ieve they are subs idiz ing small banks by pay ing an insurance 
premium on uninsured depos its . Large banks would l ike to reduce the 
premium base to inc lude only insured depos its . An alternative 
solution for large banks would be to insure all dome s t ic depos its . 
Either way the base o f  depos i ts on which premiums are a s s e s s e d  would 
match the amount of depo s i ts covered by insurapce . The counter 
argument is  that the purchase - and - as sumption method of handl ing large 
bank failures has meant that all depos its of large banks have been 
insured de fac to if no t de j ure . 
4 4 
Us ing r isk based premiums and 100 percent depos i t  insurance 
would el iminate the mo ral hazard problem . Banks choo s ing more risk 
would pay higher premiums and could not bid for depos i ts  with higher 
depos it  rates because the ir higher earnings on r iskier as s e ts would 
be offs e t  by the higher premiums . 
Al though risk-based premiums may be difficul t to measure and 
as s e s s  ac curately , others argue that regulators already clas s ify 
banks into risk categor ies in the bank examination proce s s . The 
cap i tal , as s e t  and l iab ility res trict ions imposed on p roblem banks 
represent , in fact , risk- bas ed premiums . An imperfect  but direct 
method of charging r isk - based premiums might b e. more e ffic ient than 
the current implicit  sys tem of ali - or - nothing re s trict i ons imposed by 
an agency . 
S ince banks can adj us t to changes in technology , marke ts , and 
regulations fas ter than regulators can adj us t to such change s , there 
are usually s ome unregulated risky activities . Thes e  inc lude 
interes t  rate r isk due to asset and liab i l i ty management prac t ice s ,  
fore ign ac tivities risk , and off-balance sheet ac tivi t i e s  r isks . 
The se create an adverse selection problem for the insurer becaus e the 
insured has more information about its own exposure to r i sk than does  
the insurer . 
Proposed Changes in Depos itory Insurance 
Due to deregulation , the financ ial ins titut ions have to face 
a more competitive environment and are exposed to more r isk . The 
el imination of the intere st  rate ce iling , the relaxation o f  branching 
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cons traints , and the many innovations of financ ial produc ts might 
expose financ ial ins titutions to a higher chance of failure . Thus , 
depos it  insurance , which is  a protection agains t bank fai lure , might 
call for adj us tments to deal with the new environment . 
Ri sk- Based Insurance Premiums 
The current fixed- rate depos it insurance p remium has been 
subj ect to criticism .  Thomson ( 19 8 6 )  and Carls trom ( 1 9 8 8 )  commented 
that mispriced depos i t guarantees can generate many unde s ired 
effec ts . They include ( 1 )  the misal locat ion of resources ; ( 2 )  an 
ine quitable trans fer o f  weal th between society and the insured 
indus try ; and ( 3 )  ari inequitable trans fer of weal th between 
ins titutions within the insured indus try . Becaus e fixed- rate depos i t 
insurance premiums provide l imi ted liabil ity to the f inanc ial 
ins titut ions , the owne rs of the financ ial ins titutions rece ive all 
the benefits from increased leverage and portfo l i o  r i sk without 
having to pay the full costs assoc iated with the ir  ac tions . 
Leverage risk can be increased by the reduct ion o f  cap i tal 
the ins titut ion holds relative to its as sets in e i ther of two ways : 
( 1 )  increase the s ize  o f  the ins titution and f inance its  growth 
ent irely with deb t and ( 2 )  is sue deb t and distribute the proceeds of 
the debt is sue to the stock holders as dividends , ins tead of 
purchas ing addi tional assets . According to Carls trom ( 1 98 8 ) , the 
· cap ital/as s e t  rat io among banks has been decreas ing from the 1900 ' s  
20  percent to 1 9 3 0 ' s  1 5  percent to 1988 ' s  approximate ly seven 
percent . 
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Total portfo l io risk can b e  increased by changing e i ther the 
comp o s i t ion o f  as sets , of liabi l ities used to fund the as sets , or 
both . Change s in as set  compos i tion include ( 1 )  changing relative 
amounts of the portfo l io ' s  low risk as sets ( s ecuri ties ) and high risk 
assets ( loans ) ; ( 2 )  increas ing the credit. risk of the portfo l io ' s  
high r isk assets ending up with a decrease in as s e t  qual i ty ; ( 3 )  
decreas ing the divers ification o f  the portfo l io , over c oncentrat ing 
as sets in any one sector o f  the economy . The change in l iab i l ity 
compos it ion i s  involved with increas ing the ins titution ' s  rel iance on 
purchased funds . The se  tend to be a less stable source  o f  funds than 
depos i ts and create a higher pos s ib i l i ty of near term i l l iquidity and 
subsequent ins olvency . 
In addi tion , the deregulation of inte re s t  rate s brings about 
an increase in the portfolio ' s  asset and l iab i l i ty intere s t  
sens itivi ty mi smatch , thus increas ing uncertainties about earnings 
and henc e the total r isk of the portfol io . This is  the current 
problem of the thrift indus try . 
In order to maximize bank value , bank managers wil l  maximize 
the comb ined value of the bank and the deposit  insurance sub s idy .  
The subs idy i s  the fair value of the depos it guarantee that exceeds 
the insuranc e premium . Thus , mispriced depos it insurance ac tually 
subs idizes  the ins titution ' s  risk taking and thereby allows i t  to 
ho ld a r i skier portfo l io than it would if the .subs idy were z e ro . 
Other than the problem of risk taking , this depos it  insurance sub s idy 
also gives insured ins ti tutions an unfair competitive advantage over 
uninsured ins titut ions in rais ing funds and buying as s e t s  ( 6 , 7 ,  37 , 
5 6 , 5 7 ) . 
Charging risk-based depos it insurance premiums is  one o f  the 
proposals for change . I t  was opposed in the pas t by the depos i t  
insurance agenc ies and other regulators o n  the bas is o f  prac tical 
difficul ties o f  implementat ion and al so for fear that the h igh ­
premium ( r i skie r )  banks could suffer from withdrawal s  by concerned 
and uninsured depos itors once the ir risk was known to the pub l ic . 
Given the current leve l of dis closure , the prob l em o f  risk l eve l 
exposure to the pub l ic is probably minimal . 
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The problems o f  implementation exis t  because there i s  no t ye t 
a credible , general ly accep ted , and reasonably accurate sys tem o f  
risk measurement and pric ing . The FDIC stated that s uch an ideal 
sys tem would require that the FDIC be given an extreme amount of 
authority .  Moreover , it would entail unreal i s t ic data requirements 
and much more advanced risk qual ification techniques than are 
currently imaginable . In addition , it would be neces s ary to 
dismantle all exi s t ing geographic , portfolio , and cap i tal adequacy 
res traints on depo s i tory ins t i tutions , while giving the depos i t  
insurance agenc ies power t o  levy premiums up t o  1 0 0  p ercent o f  
depos its . However , i f  deregulation is t o  continue , r i s k - based 
depos it insurance p r ic ing is an idea whose time may have come . 
Minimum Capital Requirement 
Due to the many di fficulties faced by a risk- based depos it 
insurance premium sys tem , there is increased inte re s t  in the 
feas ib i l i ty of us ing higher minimum capital requirements to reduce 
the depos i t  insurer ' s  uncompensated l iab ility from guarantee ing 
depos i ts . 
The first minimum cap i tal - to - as s e t  ratios for banks and BHCs 
was imposed in December 1 9 8 1 , became effective in mid- 1 9 8 2 , and was 
amended in 1 9 8 3  and 1 9 8 5 . According to Furlong ( 19 8 8 ) , the cap i tal ­
to - as s e t  rat io for 9 8  of the largest  publicly traded BHCs increased 
from about 4 . 7 5 percent in 1980 to about 6 . 5  percent in 1 9 8 6 . 
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The pr imary reason for a · higher minimum cap i tal requirement 
is that decreased leverage of a bank wi ll lead to a reduc tion of 
de fault r i sk ( overall risk) , hence protec ting the depos i t  insurance 
fund from r isk exposure . Al though this may be .true , one should also 
no te that de fault risk and the liability o f  the insurance sys tem also 
depend on the degree of asset risk assumed by banks . Therefore , if 
the as s e t  r i sk taking of banks were increased to a greater degree 
than the cap i tal requi rement , then part or all of the bene fic ial 
effec ts resul ting from the higher minimum cap ital requirement could 
be offset  by the greater as set risk . A higher minimum cap i tal 
requirement alone may no t serve the purpose as wel l  as it should .  
In addi tion , there i s  a worry that the requirement o f  higher 
minimum cap i tal itself might indirectly lead to the undertaking of 
higher as s e t  risk . The underlying logic is that banks that are 
required to increase cap ital will shift to higher yielding , ri skier 
ass ets to increase the rate - of - re turn on equity . 
James ( 19 8 7 )  showed that higher cap ital requirements can 
worsen an underinve stment problem . That is , a bank that i s  faced 
with rais ing re lative ly more capital to fund new proj ec ts  would tend 
to give up certain low risk ventures in which it  might o therwise 
inve s t . As a resul t , the bank ' s  portfolio wi l l  end up smaller and 
include relatively more risky as sets than i f  cap i tal requirements 
were lower . However , one should be cautioned about accep t ing th is 
finding becaus e , according to Furlong and Kee ley ( 19 8 7 ) ,  with 
underpr iced dep o s i t  insurance the marginal gain to a b ank from 
increas ing a s s e t  risk decl ines as its cap i tal to depos i t  ratio 
increases . Therefore , banks may. only increase the ir  a s s e t  r i sk to a 
l imited extent . 
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Ano ther criticism of the present cap ital requirement is its 
inab i l ity to inc lude . o ff-balance sheet ac tivi ties in c alculat ing 
cap ital requi rements . This may encourage banks to inc reas e  the ir 
leverage as a way to increase their bank value at the cost o f  a 
higher exposure o f  risk to the deposit insurance sys tem (moral hazard 
problem) . 
The mo s t  popular off- balance sheet activities  include 
commercial l oan sales and Standby Letters of Credit ( SLCs ) . The ir 
volume has been increas ing s igni ficantly in recent year s . The 
current sys tem does  require that loans sold wi th recour s e  ( i . e . , with 
an is suing bank ' s  guarantee agains t default )  be treated as as sets  
when calculating cap ital requirements . However , commerc ial loans are 
seldom sold with recours e ,  very naturally becaus e of the tendency of 
banks to avo id extra burden . On the other ha�d , unl ike commerc ial 
loan sales , SLCs are no t cons idered at al l when calculating cap i tal 
requirements . In orde r to serve the purpose o f  higher cap i tal 
requirements wi thout the s ide effects of off- balance sheet 
activities , the regulatory agenc ies might cons ider encouraging the 
use o f  loan sales wi th recourse by regulation or incent ive and/or 
inc luding p art or  all of SLCs in cap i tal requirement calculations . 
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Another.  critic i sm re lated to the present minimum cap i tal 
requirement is its  uniform s tandard for all banks . Wi thout r isk 
level taken into account , it  is  pos s ible that s ome banks mee t ing the 
cap i tal s tandards can now hold a riskier portfo l io than they could 
previous ly hold with the same degree of leverage . Once again , 
becaus e o f  the fixed- rate depo s it insurance premium , i t  i s  very 
l ikely that bank as s e t  risk will rise . Therefore , i f  p o s s ib l e , the 
depos i tory insurance . agenc ies should vary the minimum cap i tal 
s tandard on a bank -by -bank bas is . I f  a fixed minimum cap i tal 
requirement i s  to be implemented , then they should vary the audi ting 
frequency accordingly . Further research sugges ted that a s ingle ­
audit guarantee i s  a much more effec tive method than perpe tual 
guarantee when us ing a minimum capital s tandard to reduce the 
insure r ' s  l iab i l i ty .  Pyle ( 19 8 6 )  carr ied out an opt ion theore tic 
analys i s  of depos i t  insurance which was p ioneered by Merton ( 19 7 7 , 
1 9 7 8 ) . He s tudied the perpetual depos i t  insurance sys tem ( insurance 
is  automatical ly renewed after each audit )  and the s ingle - audi t  
depos i t  insurance ( insurance contrac t i s  renegotiated after e ach 
audi t ) , and compared both wi th the as sumpt ion o f  pay - as - you- go audi t 
costs ( audi t costs are charged to the insured _ins titution at the time 
of the audi t ) . He confirmed that the insurer ' s  l iab i l i ty due to a 
perpe tual guarantee is  greater than the l iab i l i ty from a s ingle 
period guarantee . In addit ion , after comparing the elas t i c ities  of 
these  two insurer l i ab i l it ies with respect to the insured ' s  as set 
value to  depos i t  ratio , he  arrived at the above conc lus ion . 
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Ano ther problem c ited i s  the continued us e o f  book values for 
cap i tal regulation which may lead to the fai lure to c l o s e  
economical ly insolvent firms o n  a timely bas is . Thi s  can j eopardize 
the long - run effectivene s s  of the depos it insurance sys tem . The use 
o f  book values has led to insurance renewal at fixed rates des p i te 
de teriorat ion in the economic condit ion of the b ank and has supported 
the l ack of t ime l ine s s  in clos ing failed ins titutions . A more 
real i s t ic and prac t ical approach would be the moni tor ing of cap i tal 
on a market value bas is ( 2 2 , 30 , 4 8 ) . 
One Hundred Percent Depo s i t  Insurance Coverage 
Ano ther proposal on depos i t  insurance i s  the one hundred 
percent depos i t insurance coverage . The reasons support ing thi s  
proposal are bas ically on the grounds of greater e ffic iency and 
equity . The e fficiency argument is bas ed on the fact that l imi ted 
depos i t  insurance leaves depos itory ins titutions unprotected agains t 
runs by uninsured depos itors , and the greater the degree o f  pub l ic 
disclosure of the problems of prob lem banks , the more l ike ly are such 
runs to occur . The equi ty argument for 100 percent depos it insurance 
is  based on the evident pre ference of the depos i t  insurance agenc ies 
to emp loy the purchase - and- as sump tion me thod , rathe r  than depo s i t  
payoff , whenever pos s ible i n  the case of failure s  o f  l arge 
ins titutions . This  leaves large ins titutions with an unfai r  
advantage i n  compet ing for uninsured depos its . 
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On the o ther hand , 100 percent insurance might reduce the 
incentive o f  depos itors in evaluating the soundnes s  and s afe ty of the 
depos itory ins ti tutions thus encouraging them to undertake larger 
risk . Another argument agains t this propo sal centers  on the increase 
in risk to insurance funds . I t  is likely that i t  will  lead to the 
virtual terminat ion o f  depos it payo ffs in favor o f  o ther approaches 
and more important ly , affe c t  or retard the pace o f  deregulation due 
to the increased r isk to the depos it insurance agenc ie s . 
Other Coverage Propos als 
There are o ther propo sed change s in coverage . They include 
100 percent insurance o f  demand depos i ts but l imi ted or no insurance 
of t ime depos its . The maj or problem here is that due t o  deregulation 
and the innovat ions o f  many new variet ies of accounts s uch as NOW and 
Super - NOW , i t  i s  becoming more di fficult to dis tinguish between 
trans ac tion and nontransac tion accounts . 
Other than propo sals on the change of coverage , the re is  also 
a proposal to give depos itors an op tion to purchas e  add i t ional 
depo s i t  insurance covering depos i ts in excess o f  the general l imit of 
$ 100 , 000 . I t  was argued by Carls trom ( 1 9 8 8 )  that there is  l i ttle 
incent ive for depos itors to do s o  because of the pos s ib l e  extens ion 
of the l imi t to different accounts held by each individual . Also , 
Cooper and Frase r  ( 19 8 4 )  argued that because o f  the dominance of the 
purchase - and - as sumpt ion approach in handl ing bank fai lur es ,  100 
percent depos it  insurance is  virtually in effec t .  The present 
problem i s  no t one of inadequate depo s it protection , but rather one 
o f  reconc i l ing such protect ion wi th an increas ingly deregulated and 
risky banking environment . 
Merging o f  Regulatory Agenc ies 
Ano ther proposal is the merging of the depos i t  insurance 
agencies . Arguments for this proposals are bas ical ly : ( 1 )  due to 
deregulation , different financ ial ins ti tut ions are ge tt ing much more 
al ike , thus centralization of regulatory authori ty s e ems appropr iate 
as a means of promulgat ing cons is tent rules ; ( 2 )  mergers  of firms 
regulated by different agenc ies require that each agency review and 
approve the comb ination which can . lead to interagency disputes which 
impose co s t s  on society ; ( 3 )  the regulatory gaps and overlap s  
generate unnec e s s ary problems ; ( 4 )  differ ing goals  of the regulatory 
agenc ies might halt compromi se solutions ; and ( 5 )  regulatory 
consol idation wi l l  re sul t in reduced adminis tra t ive expens e s . 
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Arguments agains t this proposal include : ( 1 ) the l ike l ihood 
that shared supervis ion can avo id regulatory cap ture ( the 
ident ification o f  the regulator with the regulated) ; ( 2 )  s ince the 
current sys tem allows a depos itory ins titut ion to choose  among 
several di fferent types of s tate and federal charters and with each 
goes  a di fferent pr imary regulator and insurer ,  the re i s  a 
po s s ib il ity o f  benefic ial competit ion among agenc ie s ; and ( 3 )  the 
banking , thr i ft , and credit union indus tries deve loped for s eparate 
purposes and with specialized regulators . De spite the innovations of 
recent years , firms and agenc ies today s t ill look qui te di fferent . 
Although the var iat ion wi ll fade wi th time , it may be di fficul t to 
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reconc ile ini tially ( 8 , 1 5 , 54 ) . 
Summary 
The focus of the prob lems o f  the depos i t  insurance sys tem is  
p laced on the moral hazard problem created by the pres ent depos i t 
insurance sys tem . The adoption of r isk based premiums can discourage 
banks from taking excess ive r isks . The implementation o f  thi s  
pol icy , however , w i l l  require better programs for r is k  measurement 
and pric ing . The regulatory agenc ies can es tabl i sh a s tr ingent bank 
minimum cap ital requirement even be fore these  programs can b e  well 
developed . When calculat ing required cap i tal , as s e ts should be 
valued at marke t ,  rather than book value and off - balance she e t  
ac tivit ies should b e  included . 
CHAPTER IV 
BANK POWERS 
Introduction 
Res tr ic t ions on bank ownership and powers  are imposed 
primarily by the Glass - S teagall and Bank Holding Company Ac ts . The 
former res tricts  affil iation of member banks wi th firms involved in 
secur i ties underwr i t ing , and the latter regulate s the assoc iat ion of 
banks with other financ ial and nonfinanc ial firms . There are various 
s tate laws that re s trict affil iations between banks and nonbank 
enterprises . 
The reas ons supporting the elimination o f  the s e  res tr i c t ions 
are generally as fo llows : Firs t , banks canno t compete wi th nonbanks 
in the current domes tic regulatory environment and also  the confl ict 
between economic forces and regulation extends beyond dome s t ic 
markets . S econd , the pr imary concerns that led to res trictions in 
the 1 9 30s are not prevalent today , i . e .  concentrat ion o f  res ources 
and the po tent ial for self deal ing have been cons trained by ant itrus t 
laws and Secur i t ies and Exchange Commi ss ion regulat ions and 
surve illance . Third , there has been a decl ining trend in bank 
pro fitab i l i ty in recent years . If  banks are allowed to divers i fy 
into such ac tivities  as underwr iting and other inve s tment banking 
ac t ivi t ies , bank profitab i l ity and risk management might improve and 
thus enhance the s tab i l i ty of the banking sys tem . Final ly , there is 
a cos t advantage in the form of economie s of scope in allowing banks 
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firms . 
The main argument agains t e l iminating the re s tr ict ions is 
that banks play special role s in the economy that requires more 
pro tect ion through regulation . Banks provide pub l ic acc e s s  to the 
payments sys tem . They provide a source of l iquidi ty to the economy . 
They play a critical role in stab i l iz ing the economy through the 
transmi ss ion of monetary . pol icy and , more importantly , they are the 
pub l ic connect ion to the safe ty .ne t provided by depo s it insurance and 
the Fede ral Re serve ' s  source of ul timate liquidi ty . The extens ion of 
banks into nonbank act ivi ties may also be unde s irable  be cause of the 
comparat ive advantages that the imp l i c i t  sub s i dy o f  the safe ty ne t 
provide s  to them , and the greater potent ial expo sure o f  the insuranc e 
funds or taxpayers to the financ ial problems o f  the se  firms ( 3 ,  1 5 , 
2 7 , 3 6 , 3 7 , 45 ) . 
Maj or Concerns 
Bank Insulat ion from its Affil iates 
The insulation ques tion is crucial . I f  banks can be 
insulated from the ir affil iates , there is  no need to res tric t the 
ac tivi ties in which the affi l iates o f  a bank may engage . On the 
other hand , i f  banks canno t be insulated from the ir aff i l iate s , it  
might be necessary to restrict the ac tivi ties  of bank affil iate s  so 
that the safe ty ne t wil l  no t be abus ed . 
S e i dman ( 1 9 8 7 )  bel ieve s that insulation i s  po s s ible and that 
direct regulatory and supervisory authority over nonbank ing 
affil iates or even bank owners is unnece s s ary . Seidman ' s  approach 
includes the retaining of the existing legis lation o f  Sections 2 3A 
and. 2 3B o f  the Federal Re serve Act ( FRA) and a few supplements . 
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Sect ion 2 3A of the FRA res tricts a bank ' s credi t extens ion to 
any s ingle nonbank affil iate and to all . of i ts nonbank affi l iates 
taken toge ther to 10 percent and 20 percent , respect ively , of the 
bank ' s  cap ital and surplus . Such extens ions of credi t incur 
s tr ingent col lateral requirements . In addi tion , i t  requires that al l 
bank trans ac t ions with affiliates be on terms and conditions 
cons is tent with s afe and sound banking practices . Thi s  has been 
interpreted to mean that any transaction between a b ank and i ts 
affil iates mus t  be on terms and conditions that are a t  leas t as 
favorable to the bank as those prevail ing in s imilar trans ac t ions 
between the bank and unaffil iated third partie s . S e i dman further 
sugge s ts that i t  should be expanded to cover nonb anking sub s idiaries 
of banks . 
Section 2 3B of FRA specifies that all bank transactions with 
affil iates mus t be conduc ted at an " arm ' s length" di s tance . This 
sect ion also prohib its any ac tion which would sugges t  the b ank is  
respons ible for  any ac tion of the nonbank affil iates o r  s tat ing or  
imp lying that the ir ob ligations are covered by federal depos i t  
insurance . 
Additional po licies  that Seidman sugges t s  inc lude : ( 1 )  
authority to audit both s ides of any transac t �on b e tween a b ank and 
its subs idiaries  or affil iates ; ( 2 )  authorized col lect ion o f  certain 
financ ial data from bank affi l iates , where needed ; ( 3 )  c le arly 
de fined regulatory authority to require , from e ither a prac t ical or 
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r i s k  s tandpoint , that any nonbanking act ivity be house d  outs ide the 
bank in e i ther a subs idiary or affil iate ; and ( 4 )  exc lus ion from the 
bank ' s supervisory cap i tal computation any equity inve s tments in such 
nonbanking bus ine s s . 
In sum , S e idman believe s that e ffect ive insula tion i s  
pos s ible . Banks can be protec ted agains t legal r isks i f  appropriate 
procedures  are fo l lowed to ensure that the operations o f  the i r  
affil iates are conduc ted i n  truly separate corporate ent i t i e s . 
Although there are economic incent ives to treat different uni ts as 
part of an integrated ent ity , these incent ive s can be contro l led 
largely through exi s t ing legis lation such as Sections 2 3A and 2 3B of 
the FRA and proper supervis ion of the bank itsel f , with appropriate 
penal ties  fo r abuses . By do ing so , the marke tplace w i l l  view 
di fferent units  wi thin an organization as dis t inc t corp orate enti ties 
if  they are , in fac t , treated accordingly by the supervis ory 
agenc ies . However , this  approach will call for more FDI C  supervisory 
s taff to accomp l i sh this task . 
Huertas ( 1 9 8 7 ) also believes that insulat ion i s  pos s ible . He 
emphas ized that when examining whether banks can be insulated from 
the ir aff i l i ates , the s tandard to emp loy is that interaffi l iate 
transac tions be done on subs tantially the same terms and conditions 
as transac tions with unaffi l iated third partie s . Such a s tandard 
safeguards the bank , but allows the bank to b�ne f i t  from be ing part 
of a broader integrated enterprise . 
Huertas be lieve s that the exi s t ing legis lation , Sect ion 2 3A 
and 2 3B o f  the FRA , has already insulated banks from the ir affil iates 
in credit transact ions and has been quite effective in prevent ing 
failures  o f  banks due to transactions with affil iate s . In addi tion , 
after s tudying five other proposals for regulatory de s ign ,  he found 
that all o f  them also keep in place the exi s t ing l e g i s lation . 
Furthermore , s ome plans provide for additional insula t ion o f  the 
bank . They are : 
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( 1 ) Ant i fraud provis ion . This would re inforce the anti fraud 
provis ions of the secur ities law by prohib i t ing affil iates o f  banks 
from s tat ing or  implying that the ir l iab i l i t ies are ob l i gat ions of an 
insured b ank or  insured thr ift and from stat ing o r  imp lying that 
e i ther ob l igat ions are covered by federal depos i t  insurance . 
( 2 )  S tand- alone requirement . This prohib i t s  a bank from 
directly or indirectly guarantee ing the obl igations of its  affil iates 
and requires the affiliate to disclose this to inve s tors . 
( 3 )  Arm ' s  length requirement . This makes exp l i c i t  the 
interpre tation of current law and regulat ion requir ing tha t  all  
interaffiliate transac tions be on terms at  least  as  favorable  to the 
bank as thos e  prevail ing in s imi lar transactions b e tween the bank and 
unaffil iated third parties . 
( 4 )  Limit  on daylight overdrafts of an aff i l i ate o f  the bank . 
Thi s  will take care o f  the miss ing part of the FRA ' s credi t extens ion 
requirement providing more pro tection to the bank . 
( 5 )  Bear - down provis ion .  This requir�s the b ank to maintain 
adequate cap i tal at all times , and it empowers the b ank ' s  pr imary 
federal regulator to force the owner of the bank to dive s t  the bank 
if  the bank ' s cap i tal falls below the minimum required leve l . Thi s  
, •-
i s  an extremely powerful provis ion , for i t  enab l e s  the regulator to 
s tep in we l l  before the ne t worth of the bank is  exhaus ted . I t  will 
ful ly protect the depos its  of the bank and the dep o s i t  insurance 
funds from al l r i sk , including any risk that might ar i s e  as a resul t 
of the bank ' s  transac tions with its affil iates . 
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( 6 )  Back- s top provis ion . This  would require e ach parent in 
the corporate chain above the bank to assume unl im i te d  l i ab i l i t ies 
for the bank subs idiary . However , the effect ivene s s  o f  thi s  
provis ion is  doub tful becaus e the guarantee of the ho lding company o f  
unl imited l i ab i l ity i s  only as good as the company that give s i t . 
Al so , Huertas has two additional provis ions : 
( 1 )  Plenipo tentiary provi s i on .  This  would grant the bank ' s  
pr imary federal regulator the authority to wri te rules and 
regulati ons regarding interaffil iate transac tions s o  as to protect 
the safe ty and soundnes s  of the bank . There would be severe c ivil 
and cr iminal sanc tions for violations of such regulations . This  
would al low the regulator to  address in  a flexible  manner the 
concerns that prompted the provis ions c i ted above . Regulators can 
also addre s s  quickly other concerns that may ari s e  as a resul t  of 
change s in market conditions . 
( 2 )  Enforcement provis ion . This  would grant the primary 
fede ral regulator of a bank controlled by a financ ial s e rvices 
holding company the authority to seek an immediate court inj unc tion 
agains t any unsafe and unsound practice engaged in by such a bank . 
This would allow the regulator to take prompt action agains t banks 
with unsafe practice and bypass cumbersome and t ime consum ing cease -
and - de.s is t  procedure s .  
Huertas b e l ieves that the various proposals  and the exis ting 
regulations can be comb ined in a way that yields a h i gher leve l of 
effectivenes s  in insulat ion . 
Howeve r , Litan ( 19 8 7 ) criticizes the bear - down provis ion 
because regulators may s imply not be able to catch s e r ious problems 
in time . Even i f  they can , anothe r  problem ar i s e s . Although a 
targe t bank ' s  cap i tal for regulatory purposes may b e  p os i t ive (but 
below the thre shold minimum) , by forc ing dive s t iture , regulators 
s ignal to potential buyers that the bank may have s e r i ous problems , 
which can dramatically lower its resale value . ·  Li tan als o  que s tions 
the implementat ion of the bear - down requirement i f  banks were 
permitted to divers ify directly or through subs idiar i e s . In that 
cas e , if bank cap i tal fal ls below the required minimum , regulators 
could separate the bank only by selling off each o f  the nonbank 
ac tivitie s - - an operation po tential ly far more difficul t and 
dis ruptive to complete than merely dive sting a bank from its  holding 
company aff i l iate s . 
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On the other hand , Corrigan ( 19 8 8 ) empha s i z e s  that s eparation 
o f  banking from commerce should be preserved . He b e l ieve s that in 
real ity financ ial conglomerates and commerc ial - financ ial firms are 
managed in an integrated manner , and it is rare that one would go its 
own way if the other is faced with advers ity . . 
Concentration o f  Res ources 
Huertas ( 1 9 8 7 ) bel ieves that as the geographic barriers break 
down , . there will no t be a problem of concentrat ion . Even i f  there 
is , when excess  profit  exists , competit ion will  e l iminate i t . He 
bel ieves that barriers to entry produce concentrat ion . However , in 
the field of finance , there do not appear to be any s ignificant 
natural barr iers to entry . Hence , he conc luded that removing the 
artific ial barriers to affil iation between banks and nonbank firms 
will only reduce concentrat ion , not increase i t . 
Li tan ( 1 98 7 ) , on the other hand , expres se s  h i s  concern that 
if banking organizations were left to tal ly uncons trained , economic 
powe r and as set  ownership will become too concentrate d .  Excess ive 
as s e t  concentration · might also bring about advers e e ffects to the 
U . S .  pol i t ical sys tem . 
Economies o f  Scope 
There are two types of economies of scope , global and 
product - spec i fic . Global economies of scope are pres ent i f , for a 
given product mix , the to tal costs from j o int production o f  al l 
produc ts in the product mix are less than the sum o f  the cos ts of 
produc ing each produc t independently . Produc t - spec i f i c  economies of 
s cope refe r  to economies that ar ise from the j o int produc tion of a 
particular produc t with one or more other produc ts . A c o s t  
complementar i ty exis t s between two produc ts i f  the marginal cost o f  
produc ing one produc t decl ine s when it is produced j o intly with the 
other . 
An argument support ing the el imination of res tr ic t ions is 
that there are co st  advantages in the form of economi e s  o f  s cope in 
6 2  
6 3  
allowing banks t o  as soc iate with other financ ial and nonfinanc ial 
firms . J o int produc tion of financ ial services or  j o int produc tion of 
financ ial and nonfinanc ial service s  might increase economic 
e ffic iency and· potential ly lower consumer costs . 
Many s tudies . have been conduc ted to e s t imate . economies of 
scope for depos itory financ ial ins titutions . After reviewing 1 3  of 
thes e  studies ,  Clark ( 1 9 8 8 ) found that they do no t s upport a 
conc lus ion o f  global economies of scope from j o int produc tion . 
However , many o f  the studies report some evidence o f  cost  
complementari t i e s  between pairs of products . For example , Lawrence 
and Shay ( 19 8 2 )  reported cost complementarities b e tween nonbank 
ac tivity and to tal loans as well as between nonbank act ivity and 
inve s tments . D i seconomies of j o int production were reported b e tween 
nonbank ac tivi ty and to tal depos its . 
Litan ( 19 8 7 ) and Huertas ( 19 8 7 ) both agre e  that technology 
advancements that s tarted about 20 years ago had important impacts on 
economies  o f  s cope . Advances in technology are important because 
they subs tantially reduce communication and information costs . They 
make it eas ier and cheaper for financial ins titut ions to pe rform 
the ir func tions as intermediaries . Banks , insurance companies and 
other financ ial service companies are all e s s ent ial ly in the same 
bus ine s s  of providing and trans ferring information . Therefore , any 
financ ial corporat ion do ing bus iness  today should be capable  o f  us ing 
the computer s tored data that lie at the core o f  one financ ial 
service to del iver other services and lowers the c o s t s  of providing 
them all . In short , the cheaper informat ion and c ommunicat ion cost 
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and the integration o f  financ ial and nonfinanc ial s e rvices will 
result in increas ed economies of scope and firms that produce 
products j o intly will be more profi table than thos e  more spec ial ized . 
On the other hand , Tobin ( 19 8 7 )  feels  that the impor tance of 
economies  o f  s cope , espec ially for the economy at large , remains 
small . 
Competitivenes s  
I n  general , some researchers argue that the present sys tem is 
anti - compe t i tive s o  res tructuring will p romo te comp e t i t ion and reduce 
the costs o f  financ ial services . Others were concerned about the 
pos s ib i l i ty o f  increased concentration o f  economic power i f  a revised 
regulatory s tructure al lowed the development o f  large financ ial and 
commerc ial conglomerate s .  
The prob lem c i ted for the current res tric tions on bank powers 
is that financ ial activi ties wi ll cont inue to shi ft away from banks 
to nonbanks , thr ifts , and inve stment banks because o f  the trend 
towards functional real ignment in the provi s ion o f  f inanc ial 
services . Al so , nonbank depos itory ins t i tutions have been invading 
the profitable ac tivi ties that were formerly carried out by banks 
only and consequently reduc ing bank profitab i l i ty .  
Furthermore , the conflict between economic forces and 
regulat ions extends beyond domes tic marke ts . Regulatory 
discrepanc ies  among nations have caused increas ing shifts o f  
ac tivities  from the U . S .  t o  the les s regulated international markets . 
There have been attempts to coordinate international regulation of 
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the world ' s  three mos t  important financ ial centers ( New York , London 
and Tokyo ) such as the recent U . S . - U . K .  accord on cap ital s tandards . 
As long as there are res trictions of domes tic b anking powe rs , there 
remain s trong · incentives to shift toward a less  regulated 
environment . 
Thi s  idea is  further affirmed by Greenspan , the current 
chairman of the BOG , who bel ieves that deregulation is the only way 
to s trengthen the U . S .  banking sys tem and increase the 
compe titivene s s  of the U . S .  banks in globally integrated markets . At 
the same time , deregulation would el iminate many ineffic ient 
financ ial ins t i tut ions . Banks would gain acces s to new sources  of 
cap i tal and the opening up o f  new profit opportun i t i e s  would make it 
eas ier for banks to cover los ses  on old inves tments ( 24 ) . 
Li tan ( 19 8 7 ) bel ieve s that certain nonbanking indus tries , 
espec ially inve s tment banking , could generate greater comp e t i t ion for· 
banks . He s tated that in securities marke ts where banks can 
underwr ite securit ies such as general obl igation munic ipal bonds , 
marke t concentration is  lower , competition i s  more vigorous , and 
underwriting fee s  are lower than in the corporate s e curi ties  markets 
from which banks are precluded . 
Guttmann ( 19 8 7 )  worries that deregulation may no t ul timately 
s trengthen many financ ial ins ti tutions . I t  may caus e more fai lures 
in the finance indus try in the near future . New comp e t i t ive pres sure 
will push many insufficient financ ial ins titut ions out of bus ine s s , 
there is  a pos s ib i l i ty that such failures might do immense damage to 
the s tate of consumer confidence and trigger de s truc tive financ ial 
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panics . 
Vo lcker ( 1 9 8 7 )  worries that further deregulation will 
undermine an already fragile banking sys tem by unleashing excess ive 
competitive pres sures thus accelerating the already cons ide rable  rush 
into po tent ially risky innovations . 
Lovett ( 1 984)  bel ieves that insurance companies and banks are 
s trong compet i tors in managing pens ion funds , along with s ome 
independent union and assoc iation pens ion plans . In  addi t ion , 
s ecur ities  marke ting has been for the mos t  part properly segregated 
from commerc ial banking and insurance . As a separate indus try , it  
has brought help ful · competition to the financ ial sector . In short , 
commercial banks , thr ift ins titutions , and s ecur i t ie s  f i rms have 
amp le comp e t i t ion within the ir own ranks and i t  s t i l l  makes s ense to 
separate commerc ial banking from the di s tr ibut ion and marke ting o f  
secur i ties and t o  preserve inter - indus try comp e t i t ion . 
Role o f  Supervis ion and Regulat ion 
The general concerns re lated to the role of supervis ion and 
regulat ion in a res truc tured financ ial sys tem are whe ther supervi s ion 
should be cons o l idated , the use of func t ional supervi s ion and 
regulat ion ; whe ther each part of a BHC should be supervised by its 
appropr iate regulatory agency , what should be the respons ib i l i ties of 
FRS , FDIC , and OCC in the revi sed financ ial s truc ture , and the 
international coordination in financ ial regulat ion . 
Guttmann ( 19 8 7 )  sugge sts a streaml ining o f  the present 
complex web of overlapp ing and often compet ing regulatory author ities 
for better coordination . Furthermore , because o f  the current 
vtilnerable exposure of the U . S .  financ ial sys tem to globally 
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integrated and short term capital flows , measur e s  ensuring s tab i l i ty ,  
including the s tandardization o f  national regulations , are urgently 
needed . 
Kaufman ( 1 9 8 7 ) sugges ts that an offic ial central authority 
should be e s tab l i shed to oversee all maj or financ ial ins t i tutions and 
markets . He cri tic izes the present sys tem o f  diverse  and overlapp ing 
o ffic ial supervis ion for lacking a coherent overview and fai l ing to 
meet the real i t ies of the financ ial world today . Furthermore , he 
would es tab l i sh an . offic ial international author i ty to oversee maj or 
financ ial ins t i tut ions and marke ts , regardle s s  of the ir locat ion . 
Corrigan ( 1 9 8 7 )  emphas izes that banking and financ ial 
supervisory p o l ic ies  should move in the direction o f  international 
convergence . He recommends that like activi ties  be subj ect to the 
same cap i tal and other prudent ial standards , re gardl e s s  o f  where in a 
corporate ent i ty thos e  ac tivi ties are conducted or  booked . In 
addi tion , he favors the consolidated supervis ion of divers i fied 
financ ial firms which would narrow a maj or gap in the pre s ent 
offic ial supervisory network . 
Huertas ( 1 9 8 7 )  feels  that there is no nee d  for cons o l idated 
offic ial supervis ion of the ent ity owning the bank . Banks should be 
ab le to aff i l iate with any other type of firm , inc luding a commercial 
firm . He emphas ized that it is more important to pro tect  a bank 
through insulation rather than consolidated o ffic ial supervis ion of 
the entity owning the bank . 
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Confl icts o f  Intere sts 
Edwards ( 19 8 7 )  argue s that the potential abuse rel ated to 
perc e ived confl icts of inte rests  and to the trans fer ring of profits 
or as sets  from a bank to its as soc iated ent ities , the reby weakening 
the bank i s  re lated more to the corporate form emp loyed ( the holding 
company enti ty )  than to the mixing of banking and secur it i e s  
ac tivities . However , h e  suspects that b y  permitting more open 
competition among banks and securities firms , there would be less  
abuse  o f  confl ict  s ituations in the future . 
According to S e idman ( 1 98 7 ) , another benefit o f  allowing 
banks to affil iate wi th other firms is that affi l iates can be sold to 
raise cap i tal for the bank in times of financ ial difficul ty . This 
would provide a buffer for the FDIC and help to maintain a s table 
financ ial sys tem . He generally concludes that there i s  not l ikely to 
be a problem o f  conflict of interest , and even there i s , i t  can be 
fixed . For example , with respect to an informat ion p roblem , Seidman 
claims that thi s  would be handled by policies that encourage or 
re quire greater disclosure of cos ts , alternat ives , and other 
pert inent facts . In addit ion , problems of ins ider informat ion will 
be taken care o f  by addi tional safeguards and s t i ffer penal ties 
rather than prohib i ting efficiency enhanc ing comb inations o f  
ac tivi t ies . 
Vo lcker ( 1 9 8 7 ) feels that confl icts o·f intere s t  are l ike ly to 
occur when banks and the ir commerc ial affil iates deal with each other 
as both owners and credi tors ( deb tors ) .  Recogniz ing the rich his tory 
of financ ial market manipulation and the recent ep idemic  o f  whi te -
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collar c rime in financ ial institutions , he is  concerned about the new 
sources o f  fraud and intere s t  conflicts in a l e s s  regulated 
environment . 
Corrigan ( 19 8 7 )  s tres ses  the pos s ib i l i ty o f  s e l f  deal ing when 
nonbank firms are given access to the pub l ic ' s  money and the unique 
government support mechanism ( such as depos i t  insurance ) through 
the ir banking subs idiar ies . 
Kaufman ( 19 8 7 )  bel ieves that confl icts o f  intere s t  run such 
serious risk of undermining the effic ient func tioning of the 
financ ial sys tem and the economy that lending , underwri t ing o f  
securities  and equi ty inves ting ac tivi ties should b e  kep t apar t . 
Confl icts o f  interes ts are bound to arise if  the s e  ac t ivities  are 
j o ined . 
New Act ivi ties  and Addi tional Ri sk 
Ano ther concern is the e ffect of new ac t ivi t i e s  on bank 
risks . A general consensus is  that r isk varies from act ivi ty to 
act ivity and from organization to organization , and depends on the 
relative s ize o f  the new ac tivit ies to the exi s t ing ac t ivi t i e s . Some 
new ac tivi ties  might pose few ri sks and could bene f i t  the bank , while 
others might increase the overall level of r isk o f  the bank . S ome 
ac t ivities  may only be de s irab le when adequate safeguards exi s t  to 
ensure that the bank is protected agains t exces s ive r i sks . 
A banking organizat ion can reduce i ts risk by o ffering 
service s that he lp smooth out the earnings fluctuations of bank 
ac tivi t ies . Al though divers ificat ion is general ly b e l ieved to reduce 
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risk , ins titutions could divers ify i n  a r isk enhanc ing fashion . 
Manage rs of some ins titutions may del iberately seek more r i sk , 
particul arly in view o f  the incentives for risk- taking cre ated by the 
currerit sys tem of federal depos it insurance , which charges banks the 
same insurance premium regardle ss of the ir risk o f  failure . In 
addi tion , given the ir inexperience in other l ines of bus ine s s , 
certain depos itory organizations may find the ir dive rs ification 
e fforts to be less  than successful . Therefore , i t  i s  no t easy to 
draw a conc lus ion as to the impac t of divers ification . 
However , i f  banks adopt new ac tivities conduc ted outs ide the 
reach o f  bank supervis ion , it is  important that the s e  ac t ivities are 
no t funded wi th insured depos its because underpr iced depos i t  
insurance o ffe rs an incentive for banks t o  take exc e s s  r i sk ( 3 , 36 , 
54) . 
Conclus ion 
I t  is not cer tain whether the barriers between banking and 
other financ ial and nonfinanc ial ac tivi ties  can safe ly be removed . 
I f  banks can be insulated from the ir nonbank affil iate s , there wil l  
no t be prob lems o f  self  deal ing and confl icts of interes t . However , 
i t  is  l ikely that di fferent units of a corporation wi l l  be managed as 
a whole and there is  no guarantee that even very s trict  regulat ions 
can s top interac t ions between a bank ·and i ts . affil iate s . Hence , it  
may no t be wise to el iminate the restrict ions on the l inkages of 
banks to nonbank firms . 
There is  evidence that certain nonbank ac t ivi t i e s  can 
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generate produc t - specific economies o f  s cope . There i s  als o  evidence 
that certain currently res tricted activities  do not increas e a bank ' s  
r isk while  s ome that are al lowed do . The proporti on o f  a bank ' s  new 
activit ie s  among i ts total activities als o  affects the risk level . 
Becaus e economies of scope and r isk factors vary from act ivi ty to 
activity , one should not general ize whether banks should o r  should 
not be allowed to undertake other financ ial act ivi t i e s , rather one 
should ask which ac tivi ties  and the extent of the l inkages which 
should be allowed . 
I 
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CHAPTER V 
THE PAYMENTS SYSTEM 
There have been changes in the financ ial sys tem s ince the 
introduct ion of the Fe deral Reserve Sys tem ( FRS ) . F inanc i al 
innovations , coup led with increased l inkages wi th international 
marke ts , have s ignificantly increased the vo lume o f  the payments 
sys tem . Today ' s  payments sys tem has many components and is  subj ect 
to different kinds o f  risks . Fai lure of the payments sys tem would 
impose large costs  to the U . S .  and the other countries  because as 
transac tions cease , many other economic activi ties  would also cease . 
S ince there is always some risk o f  failure , there are concerns for 
reduc ing the r i sk to wh ich the sys tem is exposed and putting in place 
procedures which will prevent failure and protect the FRS and the 
economy . 
Today ' s  U . S .  payments sys tem features numerous ins truments 
and ways that payments can be made . Other than the two tradi tional 
ins truments for payments , checks and currency , there are deb i t  cards 
( the techno logical equivalent of a check) , credit cards , and trave l 
and entertainment cards . The maj or ways that payments are made 
today , however , are Fedwire , Clearing House Inte rbank Payments Sys tem 
( CHIPS ) , and Automated Clear ing House (ACH) . 
Among the three payments sys tems , Fedwire and CHI PS account 
for 8 5  pe rcent o f  the trans ac tions made today in terms o f  dol lar 
volume . Fedwire and ACH are adminis tered by the Federal Reserve . 
I 
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The CHIPS , pr ivate ly owned b y  the New York C learing Hous e , handles 
both domes tic  and foreign payments . Both Fedwire and CHI PS handle 
large vo lumes each day , averaging 200 , 000 transac t i ons to tal ing $ 500 
b i l l ion , and 1 14 , .000 trans actions to tal ing $ 4 2 5  b i l l ion , 
respect ively . Unl ike Fedwire and CHIPS , ACH has relatively smaller 
volume and fewer transactions . Al l three rely heavily on advanced 
computer and e lec tronic technology . Thi s  has raised the concern that 
if there are computer malfunctions , the sys tem could incur large 
lo s se s  ( 1 6 ) . 
The maj or  problem o f  the Fedwire sys tem i s  that i t  allows the 
receivers to get funds immediate ly while the s enders  do not have to 
settle the ne t differences unt il the end of each day by trans ferring 
ownership of reserve balances he ld at the FRS . The FRS does  not 
charge for mos t  daylight overdrafts , but thi s  de layed s e ttlement 
encourages s enders to send early , creating large day l i ght ·overdrafts 
to obtain free credi t from the FRS . During the 1 9 8 0 s  the amount of 
daylight overdrafts has been ris ing , averaging about $40 b i l l ion per 
day . 
A s econd Fedwire problem is that the FRS inte rpos e s  itself 
between the s ending and rece iving bank to guarantee the transac tions . 
I f  a sender does  not have enough reserves to cover i ts balance at the 
end of a day , the FRS will extend credi t to the sender whi l e  the 
rece ivers remain unaffected . This leaves the FRS bear ing the credi t 
r isk that i t  i s  not supposed to . 
In pas t years , the FRS has made a couple  o f  attemp ts to 
reduce these  dayl ight overdrafts .  These inc luded the e s tabl ishment 
in March 1 9 8 6  of a b i lateral ceiling ( caps ) for a s e t  maximum 
overdraft exposure for ins titutions . In July 1 9 8 7 , the caps were 
reduced by 25 percent . 
However , . the problem remains unso lved unle s s  the dayl ight 
overdrafts can be el iminated . To do so the FRS may c ons ider the 
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rep r ic ing o f  Fed credit with the time value o f  funds and adopting the 
real time settlement o f  transactions by monitor ing b ank pos i tions and 
matching payment flows on a continuous bas i s . Be ing forced to pay 
the real cost of credi t , ins titutions would no longer be ab le to take 
advantage o f  the dayl ight overdraft loophole . The real time 
settlement of transac tions which is becoming feas ibl e  with advanced 
communicat ions and electronic accounting techni que s , would leave 
l i ttle room for daylight overdrafts . 
For the FRS to el iminate its direct bearing o f  credi t risk , 
i t  could also include in its pric ing s cheme the ac tuar ial value of 
the de fault r isk it imp l ici tly as sumes in guarantee ing final payment . 
Rul ing out daylight overdrafts will encourage marke t dis c ip l ine to 
reduce the r i sks o f  fa ilure of the payments sys tem . As private 
parties real ize that those institutions with more adequate c learing 
balances  would have transactions that c lear more rap idly and 
certainly , they would have to manage the ir payments more care fully . 
At the same time the regulatory author i tie s  should be aware that as 
fre e  daylight overdrafts are el iminated ,  i t  i s  l ikely that more 
payment ac t ivities will be swi tched to the private credit market thus 
increas ing the pr ivate market ' s  r isk exposure . Consequently , more 
s tr ingent regulations such as higher cap ital or l i quid reserve 
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requirements may b e  needed . 
Ano ther problem that the FRS has to encounter i s  the 
derivat ive r i sk when cus tomers ini tiating trans ac t ions suddenly are 
not ab le to pay , and the sys temic risk that the removal of one failed 
ins t i tution from the sys tem wi ll affect the pos i t i on o f  other 
ins t i tut ions in the sys tem making payments s e ttlement impos s ible . 
Al l three , Fedwire , CHI PS , and ACH , are expos ed to these  ri sks . Even 
though the FRS adminis ters only Fedwire and ACH , i t  might als o  have 
to rescue CHI PS as part of i ts lender of las t res o r t  respons ibi l i ty . 
CHI PS is  the sys tem that is  most  vulnerable to the s e  r isks becaus e of 
i ts internat ional character . As today ' s  U . S .  banks are becoming more 
invo lved with international activit ies , the l inkage between the 
domes tic payments sys tem and foreign banking organizations i s  
s ignificant . The failure of a non-US bank to s e ttle can lead to the 
col lapse o f  CHIPS thus affect ing the domes tic payments sys tem as 
well . The Fed is  not able to control the r i sk imposed by foreign 
ins titutions becaus e they are out of the j ur i s diction or  contro l of 
U . S .  autho r i t ie s . Therefore , there are increas ing concerns that the 
U . S .  be allowed to regulate the flow of fore ign funds to protect the 
dome s t ic payments sys tem from these dis turbances . Internat ional 
supervis ion and regulation is one of the pos s ib i l i ti e s  ( 1 2 , 45 ) . 
Ano the r  concern is the increas ing acces s  to the payments 
sys tem by nonbank firms . Nonbank firms are usually denied direct 
acce s s  to the payments sys tem , and espec ial ly to Fedwire , becaus e of 
concerns of increased payments sys tem risk . However ,  due to the 
increas ing integration of payments and secur i t ies ac t ivi ties , the 
trend towards direct placement , and the more s ophis ticated cash 
management techno logy employed by many nonbank firms ; direct acces s  
t o  the payments sys tem become s more valuable . To ge t acces s  to the 
payments sys tem roany nonbank firms have used approaches such as 
ownership of thrifts or bank ho lding companie s . 
In sum , there is  a general consensus that tho s e  that impose 
ri sks on the payments sys tem should pay the cos ts of the risks they 
create . Propo sal s for r isk reduc tion include charging for FRS 
credi t , the FRS ' s  as sumption of credit risk , and the benefits 
rece ived by nonbank firms , as we ll as el iminat ing the fre e  credi t of 
dayl i ght overdrafts and reaching international agreements on central 
banks ' respons ib i l i ties to ac t in case of fai lure . 
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CHAPTER VI 
LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRI ES LENDING 
Introduc tion 
Due importantly to the world reces s ion and dis inflation of 
the early 1 9 8 0 s , many les ser deve loped countries ( LDCs ) have been 
having difficulty servic ing the ir debts . Because o f  the large vo lume 
o f  lending by U . S .  banks to LDCs , often exceeding the total cap i tal 
of a bank , and the increas ing concentration o f  LDC loan exposure to 
the larges t  banks . , there are increased concerns about the s afe ty of 
the banking sys tem . The underlying is sue today among the LDC 
c i t izens , U . S .  bank stockho lders and U . S .  taxpayers , is who will pay 
and how wi l l  the los s be shared .  I f  the LDC c i t i z ens were forced to 
pay , they would have to expect lower l iving s tandards by us ing 
proceeds of export sales to repay loans rather than for domes tic 
consump t ion and inve stment . If  U . S .  bank s tockhol ders were forced to 
pay by taking losses  on the loans , stock dividends would be reduced 
caus ing s tock prices to fall and banks to fai l . I f  the U . S .  Treasury 
accepts the loss  or if  the FDIC guarantees payment in banking costs , 
then the U . S . taxpayers would have to pay ( 2 , 3 7 , 5 4 , 5 8 ) . 
Causes  o f  the Problem 
Prior to the 1970s commerc ial banks in Ame r ica played only a 
small role in LDC lending . The lending grew rap idly from 1 9 7 0  to 
about 1 9 8 2 , and the growth contributed to the o i l  p rice shock that 
led many o i l  import ing LDCs to borrow to cope wi th the cap i tal 
outflow needed for the purchase  of o i l . 
After the debt cri s i s  in 1 9 8 2 , when Mexico and o ther LDCs 
began having difficulties servic ing the ir debts , voluntary bank 
lending decreased s ignificantly � One reas on c i ted for the debt 
cri s is  was the sharp reces s ion from July 1981  to November 1982  
coup led wi th the unexpected worldwide dis inflation in 1982 . The 
rece s s ion j eopardized the LDCs exports to developed c ountries , 
reduced their  planned fore ign exchange receip ts , and increased the ir 
demand for credi t to maintain the ir l iving s tandards . The long term 
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debt obl igations had been contrac ted with the as sump tion o f  cont inued 
economic expans ion . The dis inflation made them increas ingly cos tly 
in real terms . 
In addi tion , a large proportion of the LDC loans were 
negotiated at floating interes t  rate s with frequent inte re s t  rate 
fixing dates . The U . S .  government attempted to reduce inflation in 
the 1 9 8 0 s  by tightening credit and increas ing short term intere st  
rates to  as  high as 2 0 . 5  percent in Augus t 19 8 1 . Thi s  increased LDCs 
borrowing costs under the floating rate agreements as we l l  as 
contributed to the dis inflat ion . Finally , the value o f  the dollar 
rose  relative to that of the LDC currenc ies making repayment of 
dollar denominated debt more di fficult . 
Al though U . S .  banks ' total LDC loan exposure and exposure 
re lative to as sets  and capital have dec l ined s ince 1 9 8 2 , the ir 
exposure to troubled LDCs has not fallen as much as the i r  exposure to 
more creditworthy borrowers . The total LDC loan exposure has al so 
become increas ingly concentrated at the large s t  U . S .  banks . 
There are several reas ons for the cont inuing large , and 
increas ingly concentrated ,  bank exposure to LDC debt ·. One is  
involuntary lending . General ly , there are three cho ices  for a bank 
i f  a debtor cannot service its debt : ( 1 )  forbearance and 
reschedul ing the loan ; ( 2 )  selling the claim and recogniz ing a loss 
in the form o f  a discount ; and ( 3 )  recogniz ing the loan as a los s by 
declaring the borrower to be in de fault .  Except for lenders with 
relative ly small outs tanding exposure , mos t  banks pre fer the firs t  
approach because of the large losses that they might incur with the 
other two . The International Money Fund ( IMF) o ffers  short term 
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funding , wi th the condi tions that the debtor government agree t o  make 
economic re forms to improve the long term outlook for repayment and 
that its  bank reach an agreement with the debtor to reschedule the ir 
loans . The bank ' s agreement can help the deb tor to obtain funds from 
the IMF and the IMF loan enhances the debtor ' s  chance s  o f  repaying 
the bank . Therefore the bank usually reaches an agreement to 
forebear and reschedule the loan to protect the bank ' s  own well 
be ing . 
Of the two general sources of funds that a debtor can ob tain , 
bank loans and bonds , bank loans become re latively more important as 
the deb tor ' s  credit rat ing declines . This  is due to the b e l ief  that 
banks have advantages over bondholders in as s e s s ing the 
creditworthines s  o f  borrowers , moni toring borrowers , and working 
through repayment problems . As de fault r isk increas e s  banks also 
have superior ab i l i ty and flexib i l i ty to work with troubled debtors 
and ultimately to s e ize assets ( 2 , 3 7 ) . 
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The U . S .  government ' s  implic it guarantee als o  contributed to 
the increased loan exposure to troub led LDCs . The u � s .  government 
he lped LDCs with policies to s t imulate the U . S .  economy and 
encouraged other indus trial ized countries to s t imulate the ir economic 
growth to increas e the ir imports from LDCs . Governments in maj or 
indus tr ial ized countries also informally encouraged banks to lend to 
LDCs on the implicit  understanding that central banks would fulfill 
the lender - o f - last - resort function .  Wi th the imp l i c i t  guarantee from 
the gove rnment ,  a bank ' s  liability is  limite d .  Hence , banks will 
tend to accept greater loan risk attempting to increase the ne t value 
of the bank . That is , they might lend to or continue to support 
certain LDCs  loans relying on an implicit U . S .  government guarantee 
rather than LDC repayment ab ility .  Ano ther s imi lar guarantee o f  
l imited l iab i l i ty is o ffered by the present depos i t  insurance sys tem 
that doe s  no t charge premiums according to risk . 
The inab i l i ty of regulators in today ' s  sys tem to close 
troub led banks unt il  wel l  after they are actually ins o lvent also 
contributed to this problem . According to Furlong and Keeley ( 198 7 ) , 
the closer a lender is to be ing insolvent , the greater is  the 
incent ive to hold risky as sets . A poss ib le solut ion to thi s  is  to 
e l iminate the cap i tal forbearance of banks . Based on current 
regulat ion , banks can maintain as an as set  the book value of a loan 
as long as there are " reasonable " prospects to collect the pr inc ipal , 
even though the market value of the loan is much lower than its book 
value . I f  thi s  regulation is removed , a much more prec i s e  market 
value bank as set  pos i tion will be reported . -•• 'II, 
Finally , the FDI C  has been choos ing to use the purchas e - and -
as sumpt ion me thod in deal ing with troubled l arge b anks . The 
perception by the marke t that large banks would no t b e  allowed to 
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fail  contributed t o  the concentrat ion o f  the r i s k  exposure i n  nine o f  
the large s t  banks . 
Solutions that Have Been Pursued 
Loan Wr i teo ffs by Lenders 
In 19 8 7 , banks have wri tten off a sub s tant ial portion of 
the ir LDC loan exposure resulting in a large reduct ion in the ir 
equity . Desp i te the large profits and addi tions to equity from other 
bus ine s s  that o ffset the writeoffs that year , three large bank 
ho lding companies  announced new common equity is sue s  dur ing 1 9 8 7  and 
other large bank holding companie s were cons ider ing the same pol icy 
or a reduct ion in dividend payout to build up the i r  equi ty accounts . 
Deb t - for - Equi ty Swaps 
Debt - for - equity swaps include the exchange o f  LDC debt , 
usually at discounts from par value , for equal value o f  shares or 
other equity inves tments in enterprises operat ing w i thin the debtor 
country . U . S .  regulators have been liberal iz ing the regulat ions 
related to this  area . However ,  in many LDCs the number o f  
enterprises  sui table  for debt - for - equi ty convers ion i s  qui te l imited . 
Debt Secur i tizat ion 
S ecuritization means banks package the i r  debt with a payment 
guarantee o f  frac tional shares of the packaged deb t . This  approach 
i s  speculat ive in nature and would no t l ike ly lead to a long run 
solution . 
Debt Deal ing 
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Deal ing LDC deb t i n  a secondary marke t has been i n  pract ice 
s ince the debt cris i s  in 1982 . This is  no t an ultimate solut ion 
becaus e the marke t is so  small that any o ffer o f  a large quantity of 
a country ' s  debt depresses b id prices dramatical ly . The sales are at 
marke t value , so  the seller usually incurs sub s tantial losses . 
Furthermore , s ince the discount from par value may no t b e  captured by 
the deb tors , the ir s trains still  cannot be eas e d . 
The Baker Plan 
In October 1 9 8 5 , U . S .  Treasury Secretary J ame s A .  Baker 
announce d  a plan for the LDC debt cri s is . Baker urged U . S .  banks to 
cont inue providing enough new-money loans to s t imulate real economic 
growth in 1 5  heavily indebted LDCs . In return , thes e  LDC debtors 
were to s trengthen the foundation for long- term growth and eventual 
deb t service by adop ting marke t oriented reforms of dome s tic 
po l ic ies , inc luding extens ive privatization of s tate owned 
enterp r i s e s , and el iminat ion of some producer and consumer subs idies . 
Exchange Debt for Bonds 
This s ignificant arrangement that allowed LOG s  to exchange 
the ir debt s  he ld by banks and government for bonds through an auction 
arrangement was deve loped by J . P . Morgan & Company , the U . S .  
Treasury , and the Mexican government in late December 1 9 8 7 . This  
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approach i s  still in an experimental s tage and there i s  no certainty 
about the ne t e ffect . I t  is also no t certain that this  approach 
could apply to o ther LDCs because they do not have the fore ign 
currency reserves required to purchase the U . S .  Treasury or  other 
s imilar secur i ties  that would support any new bond i s sue . 
Fundamental I s sues of the Prob lem 
The LDC debt is sue is fundamentally a que s t ion of how loans 
are go ing to be paid back in the long run and how i s  the lo s s  go ing 
to be shared among the lenders (U . S .  bank s tockholde rs ) , guarantors 
(U . S .  taxpayers ) , . and borrowers (LDC c itizens ) . 
I f  the borrowers are forced to repay the loans on s chedule ,  
i t  can only be done if  they sell  their products  to o ther countries 
( export for do llars ) ,  cease import ing from others , and use the export 
earnings to pay off debt . This means they cannot c onsume the thing's 
they produce and they cannot import consumer goods . Thus the ir 
l iving s tandard mus t  fall sharply to pay deb t . Al s o , they cannot 
import cap i tal goods to keep produc ing exportab l e s . There i s  
probably a l imit t o  how poor such people are will ing t o  be before 
they throw out the ir gove rnments and de faul t on government debts . 
Thus , LDC governments and U . S .  banks canno t push thi s  s o lution too 
far . 
By reschedul ing the deb t the banks hope to recover al l of 
the ir loans but over a longer period . Supposedly thi s  wi l l  not 
reduce LDC l iving s tandards as sharp ly but for a longer period and 
thus keep the revo l t  and de fault option at bay . Re s chedul ing also 
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al lows the bank t o  ignore , for regulatory purpo s e s , the real i ty of an 
as s e t  which has dec l ined sharply in market value . Thi s  means that 
bank s tockholders  do not have to be told openly that the i r  equity in 
the banks has decreased . S ince the financ ial marke ts have long 
recognized the r i sk of the se LDC loan as sets by trading down the 
price o f  b ank stocks to reflect the loan losses , s tockholders are 
we l l  aware of the losses . 
By wr iting off 2 5  percent to 50 percent o f  the i r  LDC loan 
exp osure in 1 9 8 7 , banks recognized a large reduc t ion in e quity on 
the ir financ ial s tatements . This occurred in 1 9 8 7  b ecause the banks 
had large profits and addit ions to equity from other bus ine s s  that 
year to o ffs et the wr iteo ffs . These  ac tions in the s tock market and 
loan wri teoffs are a recogni tion that bank s tockholders are sharing 
the real losses  wi th the LDC citizens . 
The propos als and negotiations are efforts to  shift the 
shares of the losses to others . Banks want to shi ft more o f  the los s  
onto the LDC c i tizens through lower l iving s tandards . LDC 
governments want to shift the loss onto bank s tockho lders ( and lower 
the ir wealth and l iving s tandard) . Both bank management and LDC 
governments would l ike to shift a b igger share o f  any loss  to a third 
party - - the U . S .  c i tizens - - and lower the ir l iving s tandard . 
The U . S .  government could buy the loans from the banks saving 
the i r  s tockho lders and forgive the loans due from LDC s  to protect 
the i r  l iving standard . Funds would be raised from U . S .  taxpayers or 
bank cus tomers through depos i t  insurance premiums , and lower the ir 
l iving s tandard . 
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Reasons why U . S .  taxpayers might wish to s ub s idize LDCs are 
( 1 )  U . S .  taxpayers feel  morally obligated to help the LDC ' s  to avo id 
fac ing the unpleasant cons equences of the ir earl i e r  borrowing 
dec i s ions or  ( 2 )  if too large a share of the l o s s e s  is  p laced on bank 
s tockholders , large banks will fail , the insurance fund will  fail , 
and U . S .  taxpayers will have to pay to keep the payments system in 
the U . S .  func tioning . Either way taxpayers would share the losses . 
The U . S .  government mus t therefore measure how much the bank 
s tockholders can lose before taxpayers have to p ick up too large a 
problem at the FDIC , how much LDC c itizens can and will  lose in the ir 
l iving s tandard before de faul ting on the loans and what can the U . S .  
gain from all thi s . The Baker Plan was intended to yield a gain for 
the U . S .  by saying that the U . S .  would help thos e  LDCs wh ich 
converted to the U . S .  ideology . That is , if  they freed the ir 
markets , allowed competi tion , and sold government bus ine s s e s . 
CHAPTER VI I 
BANK STRUCTURE IN SOUTH DAKOTA 
Banking Facil ities in South Dakota 
Thi s  section describes the banking fac i l i t i e s  avai lable in 
South Dakota as of June , 1988 . Data was suppl ied by the South Dakota 
Department of Commerce and Regulation , Divis ion o f  Banking . 
Banks and Banking Offices 
The number of banks in South Dako ta is  dramatically smaller 
today than in the pas t four decades . Some reasons for thi s  decrease 
are ( 1 )  independent banks were sold to become branches of o ther banks 
and ( 2 )  due to deregulat ion in the early 1 9 80s and advances  in 
te chno logy , many inves tment substitutes  avai lable out o f  the state 
are now . within reach of the local population hence reduc ing the 
demand for local banking services . 
The number of branches ,  on the contrary , has increased 
s i gnificantly from the past . One pos s ible reas on i s  that as 
communication and transportat ion me thods improve , urban populations 
spreads out and banks have to es tabl ish branches  to cap ture 
cus tomers . The s ituat ion for 1988  is dep icted in Table  7 . 1 . 
Unit and Branch Banking 
As shown in Tab le 7 . 2 ,  there are s ignificantly fewer branch 
banks than unit banks : 8 1  unit banks compared to 54 b ranch banks . 
Mo st  of the National banks with branche s tend to have more branche s 
Table 7 . 1  
Commerc ial Banks and Banking Offices 
in South Dakota , June 1 9 8 8  
Charter 
Nat ional 
S tate 
Total 
Charter 
Banks Branches To tal Offices 
24 70 94 
111 90 201 
1 3 5  1 6 0  2 9 5  
Table 7 . 2  
Unit Banking and Branch Banking 
in South Dakota , June 1 9 8 8  
Unit 
Banks 
Branch 
Banks 
To tal 
Banks 
National 1 5  9 2 4  
S tate 66 45 1 1 1  
Total 81 54 1 3 5  
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than do s tate banks . Of the nine National banks with branches , one 
has 3 2  branches or nearly half of the total Nat ional bank branche s .  
The others have from one to e ight branche s .  Of the 4 5  s tate banks 
wi th branches ,  3 6  have only one or two branches .  The maximum number 
of branche s a bank in this category has is e ight . The s i tuation for 
1 9 8 8  is dep ic ted in Table 7 . 2 .  
Population per Bank and Office 
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From the 1940s to the 19 60s , the average ratios o f  populat ion 
per bank was about 3 , 900 , as of June , 1 9 8 8  the rat io  is  5 , 2 5 2 . Both 
a growing population and a decrease in the humber o f  b anks 
contributed to this  change . 
S ince the 1940s , populat ion per office decreas ed from 3 , 180 
to 2 , 8 3 5  in 1 9 6 2 . By 1 9 8 8  this rat io had fal len to 2 , 40 3 . The 
s i tuation for 1 9 8 8  is  dep icted in Table 7 . 3 .  
Bank Ho lding Companies 
There are 7 3  bank ho lding companies in S outh Dako ta o f  which 
6 2  are one - bank ho lding companies and 1 1  are mul t ibank holding 
companie s .  Bank holding companies are a dominant feature of the U . S .  
banking indus try and it should no t be surpris ing that the maj ority of 
South Dakota banks are owned by holding compani es . S ee Table 7 . 4 .  
Financ ial Summary o f  South Dakota Banks 
This sect ion summar izes the analys is o f  the financ ial data of 
banks in South Dakota . Data of 137  banks were ob tained from the 1 9 8 7  
and 1 9 8 8  editions of the Commerc ial Wes t  Bank Directory o f  the Upper 
Population 
Number 
Table 7 . 3  
Populat ion per Bank and per Banking Office 
in South Dakota , June 1 9 8 8  
Bank 
709 , 000 
135  
Population/Number 5 , 2 5 2  
Table 7 . 4 
Office 
709 , 000 
2 9 5  
2 , 403 
Bank Holding Companie s in South Dakota , J une 1 9 8 8  
Banks Owned Bank Ho lding Companies 
1 6 2  
2 8 
3 1 
4 0 
5 0 
6 1 
7 1 
To t a l  94 73 
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Midwe s t .  Two banks are primari ly involved with a credit card 
bus ine s s  and were not inc luded .in thi s  analys i s . In· addit ion , 
al though the data for the maj ority of the banks are dated 1 9 8 7 , 12 
banks ' data were no t available for that year and 1 9 8 6  data were 
sub s t i tuted . 
De finitions 
Cash and due . Cash and amounts due from depos i tory 
ins titutions include : non- interes t bearing balanc e s , currency and 
co in , and intere s t - bear ing due from depo s i tory ins t i tut ions whether 
in the form o f  savings or time balances . 
U . S .  secur i t ies . U . S .  Treasury secur i t ies  and U . S .  
Government agency and corporation obligations . 
Other secur i t ie s . Secur i ties is sued by s tates and pol itical 
subdivis ions in the U . S .  and all other deb t and equity secur i ties 
( including Federal Re serve Stock) and holdings of p rivate 
certi ficate s of partic ipation in pools of res identi al mortgage s 
i ssued by others that are not guaranteed by the U . S .  Gove rnment and 
are no t held in trading accounts . 
Federal funds sold . Includes federal funds s o ld and 
securities  purchas ed under agreements to resell . 
Loans and leas es . Loans and leases ne t o f  unearned income , 
but before allowance for loan and lease los·ses . 
Total as sets . Includes cash and due from banks , secur i t ies , 
federal funds sold , loans and leases , fixed as s e ts and al l other 
as sets . 
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T ime depos its . Depos its that are payable  on a spec i fied 
date , after a specified period of time from the date · o f  depos it or 
after a specified notice period , which in al l cas e s  may not be less 
than seven days from the date of depo s i t . 
Total depos its . Included all demand , savings and time 
depos its . 
Equi ty capital . Includes perpetual pre fe rred s tock , common 
stock , surp lus , undivided profits and cap i tal reserve s , and 
cumulat ive fore ign currency trans lation adj us tment s . 
Ne t income . Ne t Income after app l icab l e  income taxes and 
extraordinary items and other adj us tments . 
Clas s i ficat ions o f  Banks 
Group I Total as sets of les s than $ 10 mill ion 
Group I I  Total as sets o f  more than $ 10 mill ion but le s s  
than $ 2 5  mi ll ion 
Group I I I : To tal assets of more than $ 2 5  mill ion but less  
than $ 7 5  mill ion 
Group IV Total as sets of more than $ 7 5  mill ion but le s s  
than $ 150 mill ion 
Group V Total as sets of more than $ 1 50 mi l l ion but le s s  
than $300 mill ion 
Group VI Total as sets of more than $ 1  b i l l ion 
Cash and Due/Total As sets 
Al though the cash accounts of banks canno t p roduce income , 
banks are required to maintain a relative ly high percentage o f  the ir 
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total as s e t s  as cash and due to meet the needs for l iquidity . 
S ince the 1940s bank liquidity has been decreas ing . · As shown in 
Table 7 . 5 ,  cash and due amounted to 7 . 42 percent o f  bank as sets in 
1 9 8 7 . One of the reasons c ited is  that as comp e t i t i on from other 
financ ial ins t{ tut ions increase s , banks have to trans fer more of 
the ir as s e ts to incoming produc ing as sets in order to remain 
pro fitable . 
U . S .  Secur i t ies/To tal As sets 
Marke table securities provide banks with both l iquidity and 
income . U . S .  securities  can be long- term or short - te rm .  Long - term 
s ecurities  usually earn higher interes t  rates than the short - term 
ones . However , i f  interest  rates rise sharply , the re is  a r isk the 
prices o f  long- term securi ties may be cons iderably be low the ir 
purchase  price . There fore , banks usually prefe r  us ing longer term
· 
s ecurities  for the ir investment portfo l i o . Banks usually rely on 
short- term secur i ties for secondary reserves because they can be so ld 
to provide cash without incurring ser ious los s . 
South Dako ta banks have tradi tionally held a high proportion 
o f  to tal as s e ts in U . S .  securi ties . Table 7 . 6  shows that banks in 
Group I ,  I I , and IV are s t ill concentrating a great deal in U . S .  
s ecurit ies as earning as sets . However ,  taking banks as a whole , the 
average rat io of other securi ties/total as sets i s  almo s t  5 percent 
higher than the average ratio of U . S .  securit ies/total as s e ts . This 
means that banks are plac ing more of the ir as sets  in o ther s ecurities 
rather than U . S .  securities . 
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Group 
I 
I I  
I I I  
VI 
v 
VI 
Total 
Table 7 . 5  
Cash and Due as Percentage o f  Total As sets  
of Banks in South Dakota 
as o f  December 3 1 , 1 9 8 7  
Number o f  S tandard 
Observations Average Deviation 
10 7 . 7 2 7 . 5 2 
5 5  7 . 0 7 5 . 3 1 
42 7 . 7 7 5 . 6 2 
1 2  5 . 9 1 2 . 5 7 
2 9 . 45 
2 14 . 9 9 
123  7 . 42 5 . 5 9 
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Group 
I 
I I  
I I I  
IV 
v 
VI 
Total 
Table 7 . 6  
U . S .  Securities as Percentage of Total As sets 
of Banks in South Dakota 
as o f  December 3 1 , 1 9 8 7  
Number o f  Standard 
Observat ions Average Deviation 
14 32 . 52 1 9 . 9 0 
58  2 8 . 60 15 . 10 
43 2 3 . 2 2 1 5 . 5 1 
14 2 9 . 41 14 . 19 
2 22 . 54 
1 2 2 . 2 9 
1 3 2  27 . 2 1 15 . 9 3 
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In addit ion , this  may also reflect the increas ing number and 
variety of other secur ities available for inve s tment· . Tho se  
securities  that have higher intere st  earnings than U . S .  secur i t ie s  
became more attractive because of banks ' drive f o r  earnings i n  a 
deregulated environment . 
Other Secur i t ies/To tal As sets 
Mos t  of the other secur i ties  that South Dakota banks hold are 
secur i t ie s  is sued by s tate and local governments . Thes e  securi ties  
do no t contr ibute to  a bank ' s l iquidi ty as do sho r t - term U . S .  
securities  because they are general ly no t traded in ac tive markets . 
However , s ince the intere s t  earned on the se  munic ipal s ecur i ties is  
no t subj ect to  Federal income taxation , they are  attractive to  banks . 
As no ted above , S outh Dako ta banks ho ld a higher percentage o f  to tal 
assets in other securi ties than in U . S .  secur i t ies . See  Table  7 .  7 .· 
Loans and Leases/Total As sets 
Grant ing loans to bus inesses  and individua l s  is  an important 
function of a bank becaus e loans are its mos t  profi table as s e t . 
However , they also require a greater degree o f  adminis trative ski l l  
than do the other bank earning assets . A bank ' s loan - as s e t  ratio is  
de termined by the demand for loans and the degree o f  risk which a 
bank is wi l l ing to assume in granting loans . As shown in Table 7 . 8 ,  
South Dakota banks , particularly larger ones , are p l ac ing 
s ignificantly higher portions of the ir total as sets in loans than in 
other as s e ts discus sed above . This is encouraged by the availab i l i ty 
of depo s i t  insurance . 
Group 
I 
I I  
I I I  
IV 
v 
VI 
Total 
Table 7 . 7  
Other Securities  as Percentage of Total As s e ts 
of Banks in South Dakota 
as of December 31 , 1 9 8 7  
Number o f  S tandard 
Observat ions Average Deviation 
14 2 5 . 40 2 5 . 9 1 
58  3 2 . 19 3 5 . 84 
44 40 . 00 3 6 . 7 3 
14 2 2 . 74 13 . 7 7 
2 11 . 7 2  
2 15 . 7 7 
134 3 2 . 49 3 3 . 6 7 
9 6  
Group 
I 
I I  
I I I  
VI 
v 
VI 
Total 
Table 7 . 8  
Loans and Leas es  as Percentage of Total As s e ts 
of Banks in South Dakota 
as of December 3 1 , 1 9 8 7  
Number of S tandard 
Ob servations Average Deviation 
14 42 . 46 14 . 1 6 
5 9  42 . 9 3 1 2 . 6 2 
44 46 . 2 5 1 2 . 8 0 
14 45 . 7 8 1 1 . 7 6 
2 5 1 . 6 0 
2 50 . 5 9 
135 44 . 50 1 2 . 8 0 
9 7  
9 8  
Loans and Lease s/To tal Depos its 
The Loans and Leases - Total Depos i ts ratio explains the extent 
to which funds collected from the community as depos i ts are made 
available  to mee t  the community ' s  credit needs . Table  7 . 9  shows a 
higher than 50 percent average for al l banks . Cons ide r ing Group VI 
alone , the average of the two large s t  banks ' rat io is as high as 89  
percent . These  indicate that the banks in South Dako ta use a large 
portion of the ir to tal depos its to make loans . 
Time Depo s its/To tal Depos its 
To tal dep-o s i ts include al l demand , time and s avings depos its . 
Time and savings depos i ts are a more cos tly s ource o f  funds to banks . 
Even though by law banks have the right to wi thho ld payments o f  
savings depos i ts up t o  3 0  days , the period is  unive r s al ly waived . 
Time depo s its , espec ially Certificates o f  Depo s its , however , can only 
be cashed in before the ir maturity dates if an intere s t  penalty of 
some s ignificance is  paid . Because time depos i ts have predictable 
matur i t i e s , they cons t itute s l ightly less of a withdrawal threat . 
However , re tention o f  matured depos i ts is  sens itive to competitive 
conditions . 
S ince the 19 50s , time depos its have been an increas ing 
proport ion of total depos i ts in South Dakota banks . Table 7 . 10 shows 
that on ave rage , banks ' time depos its account for more than 60 
percent o f  to tal depos its . One reason c ited for the growth o f  time 
depos its i s  that with increased competition wi th other financ ial and 
nonbank ins t i tut ions , banks have had to increase inte rest  rates be ing 
Table 7 . 9  
Loans and Leas es as Percentage of Total Depos its  
of Banks in South Dako ta 
as of December 31 , 1 9 8 7  
Number o f  S tandard 
Group Observat ions Average Deviation 
I 14 47 . 3 6 1 5 . 7 8 
I I  5 9  48 . 04 1 3 . 74 
I I I  44 5 2 . 1 9 14 . 1 9 
IV 14 50 . 9 7 1 3 . 16 
v 2 5 8 . 9 5 
VI 2 89 . 04 
Total 135  50 . 3 9 1 5 . 00 
99 
Group 
I 
I I  
I I I  
IV 
v 
VI 
Total 
Table 7 . 10 
Time Depos its as Percentage o f  Total Depos its  
of Banks in  South Dakota 
as of December 3 1 , 1 9 8 7  
Number of . S tandard 
Observations Average Deviat ion 
1 1  6 8 . 9 7 1 5 . 06 
54 62 . 20 1 7 . 7 1 
38  5 9 . 18 1 6 . 6 6 
1 3  5 3 . 49 1 5 . 34 
1 38 . 9 2 
2 50 . 3 2 
119  60 . 5 1 1 7 . 24 
100 
o ffered on time depos i ts to attract funds that would o therwise have 
been inves ted e l s ewhere . Therefore , depos i tors have shi fted from 
demand to t ime depos i ts in response to thes e  higher interes t  rates . 
Equi ty Capi tal/Total As sets 
The Equi ty Capital - Total As sets ratio  measure s the leverage 
po s it ion of a bank . As shown in Table 7 . 11 ,  except for Group V and 
Group VI , the average Equity. Capital - Total As s e t s  rati o s  are rather 
high .  In addit ion , when compar ing as set s iz e  and the average of the 
ratios among the s ix groups , i t  indicate s that the ratio  is  
negat ively re lated to  bank s ize . 
1 0 1  
S ince July 1 ,  1 9 8 2  both Nat ional and s tate banks i n  South 
Dakota are required to maintain a minimum Equity Cap i tal - Total As sets 
ratio o f  s ix percent . In this analys is , 12  banks we re found fa il ing 
to comply with this  requirement . There are two in Group I ,  five in 
Group I I , two in Group I I I , one in Group IV and two in Group VI . I t  
i s  pos s ible that banks with relative ly lower Equity Cap i tal - Total 
· As sets rat ios  are disproportionately repre sented among tho se  banks 
which did no t report . 
Net Income 
As shown in Tables 7 . 12 and 7 . 1 3 ,  bank ne t income is small 
when related to to tal as sets but cons iderably higher when re lated to 
equity cap i tal due to the high degree of leverage resulting from the 
small percentage o f  cap i tal to to tal assets . 
A re turn on as sets of approximately one percent i s  lower than 
many would l ike , i . e .  about two percent . However , for banks coming 
Group 
I 
I I  
I I I  
IV 
v 
VI 
Total 
Table 7 . 11 
Equi ty Cap ital as Percentage o f  Total As sets  
of Banks in South Dako ta 
as of December 3 1 , 19 8 7  
Number of S tandard 
Ob servations Aver.age Deviation 
14 11 . 00 4 . 44 
59  9 . 5 7 3 . 17 
44 9 . 2 3 2 . 5 8 
14 8 . 6 3 1 . 84 
2 6 . 9 6 
2 5 . 14 
1 3 5  9 . 40 3 . 1 1 
1 0 2  
Group 
I 
I I  
I I I  
IV 
v 
VI 
Total 
Table 7 . 1 2 
Ne t Income as Percentage o f  Total As sets  
of Banks in South Dako ta 
as of December 3 1 , 1 9 8 7  
Number of . S tandard 
Observations Average Deviation 
6 1 . 18 0 . 2 9 
2 3  0 . 7 9 0 . 47 
2 3  1 . 04 0 . 48 
8 0 . 84 0 . 50 
1 0 . 9 9 
2 0 . 67 
6 3  0 . 9 3 0 . 48 
1 0 3  
Group 
I 
I I  
I I I  
IV 
v 
VI 
Total 
Tab le 7 . 1 3 
Ne t Income as Percentage of Equi ty Cap i tal 
of Banks in South Dako ta 
as of December 3 1 , 19 8 7  
Number of . S tandard 
Observations Average Deviat ion 
6 10 . 5 6 3 . 7 7 
23 15 . 94 3 6 . 6 9 
23  10 . 7 7 4 . 1 7 
8 11 . 06 6 . 41 
1 12 . 8 5 
2 12 . 9 6 
6 3  1 2 . 7 7 2 2 . 59 
1 04 
out o f  the agr icultural loan crisis of the mid - 1 9 8 0 s , i t  i s  probably 
satisfac tory . Cons idering the fac t that only 6 3  o f · the 1 3 5  banks in 
s tudy supply net income data , the results may b e  b iased and a 
conc lus ion should not be drawn without caut ion . 
1 0 5  
CHAPTER VI I I  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUS IONS 
Summary 
Due to var ious economic , techno logical , legal and regulatory 
forces , the U . S .  banking indus try has been undergo ing chang� s and 
encounter ing problems in the· pas t two decades . Thi s  research 
cons ide red such difficul ties in four maj or areas : ( 1 ) the depos it  
insurance sys tem ; (2 )  the banks ' l inkages with o ther financ ial and 
nonbank firms ; ( 3 )  the payments sys tems and· ( 4 )  the LDC deb ts . 
The maj or critic ism of the FDIC  is  that i t  c reates a problem 
of moral haz ard . The FDIC ' s  general use of the purchase - and­
as sumption approach in deal ing with troubled large banks imp l ies 100 
percent insurance coverage and discourages marke t di s c ip l ine for 
banks that take excess  risks . This has created an increased burden 
for the FD IC . 
Banks have been res tr icted by legislation as to the extent of 
the ir  involvement wi th secur ities underwri ting and affi l iations wi th 
nonbank f i rms . This legis lat ion was des igned to protect the s afety 
and soundne s s  of the banking indus try . According to s ome s cholars , 
however , the legis lation has hindered the profitab i l i ty and 
competitivene s s  o f  commerc ial banks . 
Becaus e of the procedure s  adopted by s ome o f  the payments 
sys tems , both po tential credit and sys tem ri sks are imposed upon the 
Federal Re s erve . In addi tion , the increased acce s s  o f  nonbank firms 
1 0 7  
to the payments sys tem and the increased l inkages wi th international 
markets  also create r isks . These r isks can lead to · fai lure of the 
payments sys tems . Furthermore , the fai lure o f  the payments sys tem 
can cause transactions and other economic ac t ivities  to cease . 
S ince the early 1980s , the LDCs have been having difficul ties 
servic ing the ir deb ts mainly due to world reces s ion and dis inflat ion . 
In the U . S . , the LDC debts are concentrated in the nine larges t  
banks . In 1 9 8 7  some of the debts were wri tten o ff , incurr ing losses 
to the banks ' s tockho lders . 
Conclus ions 
With respect to the moral hazard prob lem that the depos it 
insurance sys tem created , one solution would b e  the adop t ion of r isk­
based insurance premiums which would encourage marke t dis c ip l ine by 
ri sky banks . However , due to the difficul ties in implementing this 
me thod , a more feas ib le approach would be to imp lement s tricter 
policies  on banks ' minimum cap i tal requirements .  By inc luding off­
balance sheet act ivities in calculating required cap ital , this  
propo sal is bel ieved to  be capable of contro l l ing b anks ' excess  risk­
taking to  a subs tantial extent . In addi tion , the cons o l i dation of 
var ious fede ral insurance agenc ies can also improve regulatory 
effic iency . 
Evaluat ing the reform of the banks '· l inkage s to other 
financ ial and nonbank firms required an analys i s  of a number of 
is sues . Some o f  thes e  is sues are confl icts o f  inter e s t  and abus e of 
the safety ne t related to affiliates , the pos s ib i l i ty o f  insulat ing 
1 0 8 
banks from the i r  nonbank affil iates , economies o f  s cope and bank 
r i sks introduced by new ac tivities and banks ' profitab i l i ty and 
competitiveness . Becaus e these issues are controvers ial , i t  is still 
too early to draw a conc lus ion . 
In order to minimize the potential credit and sys tem risks 
that the Federal Reserve is fac ing today , many scho lars and this 
author conclude that the Federal Reserve should charge those  who 
impose the risks on the payments sys tem for the cos t s  of  the ri sks 
that they create . In addi tion , an international agreement on central 
banks ' respons ib i l i ties to ac t in case of cris i s  would also be 
help ful . 
The U . S .  government might be ab le to minimize its  losses on 
LDC deb ts  if it measures care fully how much the bank s tockholders can 
lose and how much LDC c i tizens can and will los e  in the i r  l iving 
s tandard before de faul ting on the loans and draw its p o l ic ie s  
accordingly . This would leave less o f  a prob lem at the FDIC  and to · 
the taxpayers . 
Recommendations for Future Research 
In light of is sues and problems raised in thi s  research , 
there is  amp le room for more research . Future e fforts should addres s  
que s t ions l ike the s e : Should the federal depos i tory insurance 
agenc ies be phased out and let the Federal ·Re s e rve have more 
respons ib i l i t ies in the safe ty and soundnes s  of  the sys tem? How can 
a more e ffic ient vendor - payments sys tem be put in p lace in the U . S .  
to sub s t i tute for today ' s  expens ive check bas ed payments sys tem? 
What can the U . S .  government do to minimiz e  the cost  involved in the 
LDC debt prob lem? And , as new powers are granted to· b anks , how will 
this affect the ir  productive e ffic iency and comp e t i t iveness ? 
1 09 
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